01__CENTNER.DOC

2/6/2007 4:55 PM

CREATING AN ‘UNDEVELOPED LANDS
PROTECTION ACT’ FOR FARMLANDS,
FORESTS, AND NATURAL AREAS
TERENCE J. CENTNER
SUMMARY
Under nuisance law, bothersome activities conducted on
farmlands, forests, and natural areas are being enjoined. The
cessation of activities on these lands is sometimes detrimental to the
ecology of an area or the continued economic viability of agronomic
pursuits. As a result, some of our nation’s farmlands, forests, and
natural areas are unnecessarily being lost to development. Because
positive attributes of undeveloped areas are undervalued, the
environmental community might lend support to owners of these
lands in the form of a more forceful defense against nuisance lawsuits.
Drawing upon an economy of nature, new legislation called an
“Undeveloped Lands Protection Act” is proposed. Ecological and
civic-societal objectives are incorporated in a legislative proposal that
would offer owners of undeveloped lands greater protection against
nuisance lawsuits. The anti-nuisance legislative response is intended
to foster a debate that will lead to greater protection for our natural
resources.
INTRODUCTION
The farm community and agribusiness firms have long
championed right-to-farm legislation to preclude nuisance lawsuits
from adversely affecting their activities and businesses (see Appendix
1).1 Agriculture was recognized as different from other business
1. See, e.g., Margaret Rosso Grossman & Thomas G. Fischer, Protecting the Right to
Farm: Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 95, 117-30
(discussing the early right-to-farm statutes); NEIL D. HAMILTON, A LIVESTOCK PRODUCERS
LEGAL GUIDE TO: NUISANCE, LAND USE CONTROL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1992)
(delineating a comprehensive analysis of nuisance law and issues); Jacqueline P. Hand, Right-toFarm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 289,
305-06 (1984) (concluding that right-to-farm statutes reverse the preference for development
under traditional nuisance law to favor the less intensive use of land).
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activities and deserving of special dispensation.2 The protection in
many early right-to-farm laws was to cover the growing and
harvesting of crops, the feeding, breeding, and management of
livestock, and other agricultural and horticultural uses.3 Some laws
sought to preserve farmland from urban sprawl.4
Over the
subsequent decades, right-to-farm laws were amended to expand
protection to business and service activities including marketing
operations and processors.5
The scope of many right-to-farm laws suggests that farm
organizations and agribusiness firms have been successful in achieving
special legislative dispensation for agriculture.6 The anti-nuisance
exception,
moreover,
benefits
agriculture
and
society.7
Simultaneously, right-to-farm laws may cause producers to be less
8
sensitive to neighbors’ rights, reduce the efficient allocation of land
9
use entitlements, intrude on the property rights of neighbors,10 and
2. See, e.g., C. Ford Runge, Environmental Protection from Farm to Market, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 200-16 (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997) (claiming that agriculture is different for environmental
protection programs); Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Reconsidered: Ten Reasons Why
Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffective, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
103, 105 (1998) (noting that right-to-farm laws are a popular form of pro-agriculture legislation
at the state level).
3. E.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2 (2002). However, the major thrust of the
legislation was to protect existing farm investments by reducing actions under nuisance law that
enjoined agricultural activities. Hand, supra note 1, at 305-06 (observing a priority for
agricultural uses).
4. See Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 152 (observing that the laws protect farmland
by limiting nuisance relief).
5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006) (protecting the processing and
packaging of eggs, the manufacturing of feed for poultry or livestock, and food and forest
products processing plants); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-4403 (Supp. 2005) (adding protection for grain
warehouses); see also Terence J. Centner, Anti-nuisance Legislation: Can the Derogation of
Common Law Nuisance Be a Taking?, 30 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10253, 10255 (2000) (identifying
several statutes that delineate broad expansion of protected activities by right-to-farm laws).
6. See, e.g., David R. Bliss, Tilting at Wind Turbines: Noise Nuisance in the Neighborhood
After Rassier v. Houim, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 535, 540 (1993) (observing that most states confer
special dispensation on agricultural producers through their right-to-farm laws).
7. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 141 (predicting that right-to-farm laws would
support continued agricultural production and a strong state economy); Hand, supra note 1, at
305 (suggesting that society reaps social benefits by keeping land in agricultural production
under right-to-farm laws).
8. Joshua M. Duke & Scott A. Malcolm, Legal Risk in Agriculture: Right-to-Farm Laws
and Institutional Change, 75 AGRIC. SYSTEMS 295, 299 (2003) (noting that farmers may believe
they are protected against injunctions for nuisances, so they are not as concerned about how
their practices affect their neighbors).
9. See Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1695 (1998) (maintaining that neighboring properties have a reduced
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protect operations that contribute to the degradation of rural
landscapes.11 While modern nuisance law has moved toward flexible
12
mediation by courts, right-to-farm laws rely on wrongfulness of land
13
use. The laws may also constitute a significant obstacle to common
law remedies against farms14 or to local governments’ ability to
15
regulate land use options.
Over the years, right-to-farm laws have faced a number of
16
challenges, with the most significant being constitutional challenges
that the laws go too far in denigrating the rights of others.17 The

choice of options for the use of lands burdened by adjacent nuisance activities under right-tofarm laws).
10. See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1172 (1999). Permitted intrusions have been called easements. Id.
11. See Reinert, supra note 9, at 1738 (expressing concern that right-to-farm laws offer too
much protection to farmers).
12. Robert H. Cutting, “One Man’s Ceilin’ is Another Man’s Floor”: Property Rights as the
Double-Edged Sword, 31 ENVTL. L. 819, 868 (2001) (noting that flexibility in the common law of
nuisance allows courts discretion in weighing equities).
13. Nuisance law may consider the wrongfulness of the defendant’s land use for the
location to adopt one-sided solutions of either an injunction or allowing the defendant’s
interference to continue. Reinert, supra note 9, at 1699-1703. This response means that rightto-farm laws can fail to consider the efficient allocation of resources. Id. at 1738.
14. See, e.g., David Osterberg & David Wallinga, Addressing Externalities From Swine
Production to Reduce Public Health and Environmental Impacts, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1703,
1707 (2004) (suggesting that right-to-farm laws may shield concentrated animal feeding
operations that are causing adverse public health impacts); James B. Ruhl, Farms, Their
Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 316 (2000) (claiming
that right-to-farm laws are an obstacle to environmental remedies).
15. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006) (preempting local
ordinances and regulations); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 953 (West 2006) (prohibiting local
governments from adopting unauthorized local ordinances). See also Wendy K. Walker, Note,
Whole Hog: The Pre-Emption of Local Control by the 1999 Amendment to the Michigan Right to
Farm Act, 36 VAL. U.L. REV. 461, 476-95 (2002) (criticizing the Michigan right-to-farm law and
its preclusion of local control).
16. See Centner, supra note 5, at 10253 (noting that right-to-farm laws have presumably
stopped a great number of nuisance lawsuits from being filed yet simultaneously have not
stopped nuisance lawsuits concerning operations and activities that predate neighboring land
uses).
17. See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (interpreting
IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993) as effecting a taking); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168,
175-77 (Iowa 2004) (interpreting the immunity provided by IOWA CODE § 657.11(2) (1999) as
violating art. I, § 1 of the Iowa Constitution). See also Terence J. Centner, Governmental and
Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 87 (2006) (evaluating constitutional challenges to right-to-farm laws to suggest the
enactment of laws based upon an economy of nature); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & Theodore A.
Feitshans, Nuisance Revisited After Buchanan and Bormann, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 121, 128
(2000) (categorizing types of right-to-farm laws).
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Supreme Court of Iowa found Iowa Code section 352.1118
unconstitutional in Bormann v. Board of Supervisors19 and Iowa Code
20
21
section 657.11 unconstitutional in Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C.
22
Although the decisions are based on the Iowa Constitution and
distinguished from other right-to-farm laws, the precedents should
23
People unhappy with the anti-nuisance
concern other states.
protection accorded by right-to-farm laws could initiate lawsuits
based upon the constitutional concerns enumerated in Bormann and
Gacke.24 Given the importance of right-to-farm laws to agricultural
business operations, an alternate approach might be advisable.
This article presents an “Undeveloped Lands Protection Act,”
(ULPA) a new anti-nuisance paradigm for the protection of lands
25
used as farmland, forestry, and natural areas. Drawing upon an
economy of nature, ecological and civic-societal objectives are
incorporated into ULPA, a uniform act that supplements existing
right-to-farm legislation by offering special protection for natural
26
The distinction is that the current anti-nuisance
resources.
protection for marketplace investments may not provide sufficient

18. IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993).
19. 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998).
20. IOWA CODE § 657.11 (1999).
21. 684 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Iowa 2004).
22. The Bormann decision found that Iowa Code section 352.11 was a per se taking under
the Iowa and federal constitutions. 584 N.W.2d at 321-22. Arguments exist that the challenged
law would not violate the U.S. Constitution. See Centner, supra note 17, at 120-21. The Iowa
court declined to make a similar conclusion in Gacke. Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 174. Rather, the
Iowa Supreme Court relied only on the Iowa Constitution. Id.
23. See Centner, supra note 17, at 145-46 (identifying the protection of nuisances from
certain business activities as affecting a regulatory taking); Centner, supra note 5, at 10258-60
(suggesting that the Bormann decision should not lead to the demise of the nuisance protection
afforded by most right-to-farm laws).
24. But see Pure Air and Water, Inc. v. Davidsen, No. 2690-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1999)
(finding that the New York right-to-farm law did not effect an unconstitutional taking); Moon v.
N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 646 (Idaho 2004) (concluding that an Idaho statute was
not offensive to the federal or state takings clauses); Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of
Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13001, at *20-22 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003)
(differentiating facts from those present in the Bormann case to conclude no unconstitutional
deprivation of property).
25. See Undeveloped Lands Protection Act (hereinafter ULPA), infra app. 2.
26. An analysis of constitutional challenges to right-to-farm laws has already discussed the
reasons for advocating a new anti-nuisance paradigm in the form of an Undeveloped Lands
Protection Act. See Centner, supra note 17, at 141-45 (evaluating constitutional challenges).
See also infra note 71 and accompanying text
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protection for natural resources.27 The object of the new paradigm is
to offer a separate, more forceful defense against nuisance lawsuits
28
Due to the amenities offered by
for qualifying land resources.
undeveloped lands, greater protection might be available to protect
and preserve these resources.29 While the paradigm does not address
the need for greater governmental involvement in land preservation,
it seeks to influence the economics of land conversion by providing
further assurance that necessary activities relating to undeveloped
30
land use may continue.
I. LAND RESOURCES VERSUS INVESTMENTS
The accepted nomenclature of “right-to-farm laws” offers a
description of the intent of these anti-nuisance statutes.31 Legislatures
intended that agricultural pursuits continue due to the investments in
facilities and the contributions that agricultural production makes to
local economies.32 Farmers were entitled to continue farming despite

27. See Andrea Ross, Justifying Environmental Regulation, 8 HUME PAPERS ON PUB.
POL’Y 6, 7 (2000) (maintaining that there is no market for environmental amenities so that they
are not valued sufficiently to prevent their demise); Duke & Malcolm, supra note 8, at 302
(observing that uncertainty as to whether right-to-farm laws providing anti-nuisance protection
detracts from their effectiveness and recommending further efforts to clarify rights). The
Undeveloped Lands Protection Act seeks to offer more protection to activities on undeveloped
lands by excluding protection for business activities. See tit. III(A), infra app. 2.
28. A few of the state right-to-farm laws already offer this protection. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 2-3202 (2001) (protecting agricultural activities that are consistent with good agricultural
practices and established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities). Others, however, are
more comprehensive and seem to offer protection based on a marketplace economy. See
Centner, supra note 5, at 10255 (citing statutes that protect business activities).
29. See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
30. This might be achieved through land use controls, such as the agricultural zoning
statutes of Hawaii and Oregon. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205-1 to -18 (LexisNexis 2005)
(establishing a state land use commission with land being placed in one of four use districts);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203–.298 (2005), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/ors/215.html
(allowing zoning ordinances “to zone designated areas of land within the county as exclusive
farm use zones”). See also Racelle Alterman, The Challenge of Farmland Preservation, 63 J.
AM. PLANNING ASSN. 220, 221-35 (1997) (comparing farmland preservation in the United
States with several other countries to enunciate the distinction that other countries control
permission on converting farmland while governments in the United States address economic
incentives to retain farmland).
31. They were intended to allow farmers to continue to farm despite objectionable
nuisance activities.
32. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002) (noting that Illinois’ Farm
Nuisance Suit Act is intended to encourage investments in farm improvements and avoid the
cessation of operations); Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 577 (Ga. 1981) (citing the Georgia
right-to-farm law and the concern about agricultural operations being discouraged from making
investments and ceasing production).
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the nuisances they created and the problems their activities caused to
neighbors.33 Many of the laws adopted a “coming to the nuisance”
doctrine whereby existing agricultural activities could continue only if
the nuisance was created due to people moving to the existing
activity.34 Under the doctrine, less protection is afforded people who
move next to existing activities due to the fact that the property’s
35
People moving to the
value already reflects the impairment.
countryside should accept some of the negative spin-offs of existing
36
agricultural production.
Some of the right-to-farm laws moved beyond the coming to the
37
nuisance doctrine to offer protection to new agricultural activities.
38
The distinction is most important. Under the classic right-to-farm
law, the protection offered is based on priorities of land uses.39 If a
farm engages in activities prior to the arrival of neighbors who find
the activities objectionable, the farm has a defense against nuisance
lawsuits.40 The special dispensation is for existing operations at the
expense of neighboring property owners who might later want to

33. The protection varied upon the provisions adopted by the legislative body. See infra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002) (noting the problem of
nonagricultural land uses extending into agricultural areas).
35. See Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 933-34 (1999) (discussing the coming to the
nuisance doctrine and the belief that people who move next to a nuisance should not benefit).
36. See Herrin v. Opatut, 281 S.E.2d 575, 578 (Ga. 1981) (observing that the Georgia rightto-farm law offered protection against nuisance lawsuits where changes in land uses on
surrounding land caused an agricultural facility to become a nuisance).
37. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4801 to -4804 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (allowing the “open
burning of crop residue grown in agricultural fields”); IOWA CODE § 352.11 (1993) (exempting
farm operations from nuisance suits regardless of when activity commences); IOWA CODE §
657.11(4) (1999) (exempting animal feeding operations from nuisance suits regardless of when
activity commences). These Iowa Code provisions were respectively found unconstitutional in
Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (overturning § 352.11) and
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 175-77 (Iowa 2004) (overturning § 657.11(4)).
38. Right-to-farm laws can potentially eliminate the equitable foundation whereby a
neighboring objectionable activity should be enjoined.
39. See, e.g., Swedenberg v. Phillips, 562 So.2d 170, 172-73 (Ala. 1990) (concluding the
right-to-farm law had no application because the plaintiffs resided on their property prior to the
construction of the defendant’s chicken house).
40. Many of the right-to-farm laws required activities to exist at least one year prior to
changed conditions in the neighborhood. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West
2002) (exempting farms from nuisance suits arising due to “any changed conditions in the
surrounding area occurring after the farm has been in operation for more than one year, when
such farm was not a nuisance at the time it began operation”).
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commence land uses incompatible with the established agricultural
uses.41
Statutes that go beyond the coming to the nuisance doctrine
require neighboring property owners to accept new nuisancegenerating activities.42 Rather than protecting investments of existing
property owners, these laws denigrate property rights of people next
to those commencing new nuisance activities.43
It was this
interference with neighbors’ property rights that was found by the
Iowa Supreme Court to go too far so that two right-to-farm statutes
were unconstitutional.44
A. Going Beyond Nuisance Law
While some right-to-farm laws may embody an equitable
resolution of competing interests, the overriding issue is whether

41. For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals considered the application of a statutory
coming to the nuisance provision in Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 859-60 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987) (considering IND. CODE § 34-1-52-4(f) (1982)). Nearby neighbors brought a
lawsuit against a manufacturing facility with a nuisance cause of action. Erbrich, 509 N.E.2d at
852. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the nuisance claim due to the coming to
the nuisance provision of the state’s anti-nuisance law. Id. at 858; IND. CODE § 34-1-52-4(f). In
analyzing the evidence, the appellate court found that the defendant had established
qualification under the law. Erbrich., 509 N.E.2d at 859. The defendant’s operations had not
changed significantly since it commenced operation in 1932 in an industrial/commercial
neighborhood. Id. After the defendant commenced operations, the neighborhood began to
develop as a residential neighborhood. Id. Because these residential land users came to the
nuisance, the defendant qualified for summary judgment under the anti-nuisance law. Id. at
859-60.
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4801 (2001 & Supp. 2005) (providing a safe harbor for farmers
burning crop residue); IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11(1)(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (granting
protection against nuisance lawsuits regardless of the established date of operation or expansion
of the agricultural activities); IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.11(1)-(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006)
(granting protection against nuisance lawsuits to promote the expansion of animal agriculture);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) (stating that an agricultural
operation is not a nuisance if it has been operating two years and meets statutory qualifications);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(1) (2004) (providing an absolute defense to nuisance actions to
operations operating one year if the conditions or circumstances alleged to constitute a nuisance
have existed substantially unchanged since the established date of operation); 3 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 954(a) (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (providing a statute of limitations against nuisance actions
where an agricultural operation meets statutory qualifications); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
251.004(a) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (using a statute of limitations to extinguish nuisance
rights).; See also S.B. 26, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2005), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2005_06/pdf/sb26.pdf
(proposing to extend anti-nuisance
protection to poultry and meat by-product facilities).
43. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316 (finding that an Iowa right-to-farm law created an
easement).
44. Id. at 321; Gacke, 684 N.W.2d at 179 (finding an oppressive effect on neighboring
property owners).
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legislatures should be attempting to grant exceptions from common
law nuisance law.45 Why shouldn’t courts simply employ nuisance law
46
to resolve conflicting interests? One justification for relief from
nuisance law involves the difficult hurdles for plaintiffs faced with
establishing proof of pollution from specific properties.47 Thus,
48
Second, because
legislatures enacted environmental legislation.
nuisance law was found to be inadequate as a mechanism for reducing
or controlling objectionable activities and practices, further
governmental intervention has occurred.49 Legislatures enacted land
use statutes and zoning regulations to assign rights and govern
conflicting interests.50

45. From an economic perspective, some scholars have advanced a return to free market
environmentalism based upon the superiority of private property and free markets which would
require the repeal of environmental laws. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, III, Note,
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives,
16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 294 (1997).
46. This arguably would be similar to a return to free market environmentalism, except
that nuisance law already requires governmental interference to delineate rights. See Gary D.
Meyers & Simone C. Muller, The Ethical Implications, Political Ramifications and Practical
Limitations of Adopting Sustainable Development as National and International Policy, 4 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1996) (observing some of the criticisms of free market environmentalism).
47. See J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution
of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1455
(1997) (noting difficulties in proof of causation, fault, injury, and damages).
48. See Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 200 Cal. Rptr.
575, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that legislation concerning the placement of unauthorized
fill into waters involved the governmental regulation of nuisances under an environmental
statute).
49. See Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 415 (1997) (noting that nuisance law was
unable to reduce pollution to optimal levels); Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills Threaten Private
Property, People, and the Environment, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 560 (1997)
(commenting that pollution controls were enacted due to the inability of nuisance law to protect
health and property). Moreover, environmental legislation generally was not intended to
preempt common law nuisance actions. See Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. City of
Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Cal. 1979) (holding that claims for personal injuries founded
upon nuisance were not federally preempted by the Federal Aviation Act); Leo v. General
Electric Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (finding that the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act did not preempt common law
nuisance); GTE Mobilnet of S. Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Pascouet, 61 S.W.3d 599, 608-12 (Tex. App.
2001) (finding that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not preempt a nuisance
claim).
50. See, e.g., Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 HARV. L. REV. 834, 837
(1924) (observing that zoning operates to prevent nuisances); Eric R. Claeys, Takings,
Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1554 (2003) (observing
that regulations prevented nuisances); see also Brief on Behalf of National Conference on City
Planning et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 23-30, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
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Thus, zoning, land use regulations, and environmental
regulations already supplement nuisance law to provide resolution for
51
many land use conflicts. Right-to-farm laws were enacted because
existing remedies were unable to address the pressures being exerted
on agricultural producers as residential and commercial land uses
52
sprawled into the countryside. Right-to-farm laws may be viewed as
an extension of land use regulations that attempt to resolve conflicts
created when people move to a nuisance.53 Nuisance law, zoning, and
anti-nuisance legislation have become accepted parts of our
jurisprudence.
A nuisance lawsuit is initiated when a plaintiff complains to a
court of an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
54
property by a neighbor. While the use and enjoyment may involve
more than economic interests, the resolution of nuisance lawsuits may
55
become overly dependent on financial considerations. In balancing
U.S. 365 (1926) (justifying zoning under a traditional nuisance-based conception of the police
power and disclaiming any intention to zone for aesthetic purposes).
51. See Andrew Auchincloss Lundgren, Beyond Zoning: Dynamic Land Use Planning in
the Age of Sprawl, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 124-25 (2004) (discussing zoning as an alternative
to nuisance law); Ora R. Sheinson, Note, Lessons from the Jewish Law of Property Rights for the
Modern American Takings Debate, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 483, 524 (2001) (noting zoning was a
response to environmental and pollution concerns that nuisance law could not adequately
address); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 1006 (2004) (noting that nuisance is supplemented by other rules of proper land use such as
pollution control and zoning); see also Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059,
1069 (N.Y. 1989) (observing that local laws may be enacted to control nuisance-like activities).
52. See Reinert, supra note 9, at 1705 (observing pressures on farmers in the form of rising
land values and neighbors who object to farming practices); Daniel Diaz & Gary Paul Green,
Growth Management and Agriculture: An Examination of Local Efforts to Manage Growth and
Preserve Farmland in Wisconsin Cities, Villages, and Towns, 66 RURAL SOC. 317, 338-39 (2001)
(concluding that agricultural zoning as a tool for preserving farmland is limited due to the low
income derived from farming).
53. See Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d 922, 925 (Idaho 2000) (finding that the plaintiffs had not
moved to the nuisance but rather the expansion of a hog operation caused the nuisance so the
state’s right-to-farm statute did not apply); Durham v. Britt, 451 S.E.2d 1, 2 (N.C. Ct. App.
1994) (finding that a turkey farmer who changed to raising hogs created the nuisance so that the
offensive activity was not protected by the state’s right-to-farm law).
54. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822 (1939) (defining a private nuisance as a
“non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land”). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS defined a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B (1997).
55. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 376 (1999) (discussing how nuisance
examples are employed in analyses of the economics of law); Keith N. Hylton, When Should We
Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 525-26 (2002) (opining
that courts compare externalized costs with benefits to determine whether relief should be
granted in a nuisance action); George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an
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equities to determine whether to grant injunctive relief in a nuisance
lawsuit, the expected costs of the damage may be compared to the
56
expected costs of abating the damage. This reliance on economic
factors shifts the analysis of nuisance law from an evaluation of the
violation of antecedent rights to an evaluation of the merits of the
57
activities.
This reliance on economic considerations may also be at the
expense of long-term health, civic, moral, aesthetic, and
58
environmental concerns. Discussions concerning property rights and
environmental quality have led to the identification of considerations
beyond economics that may be equally appropriate for addressing
conflicts.59 Rather than relying on market-based economic concepts,
greater attention might be focused on the economy of nature and the
60
civic economy.
The fact that we are a society of laws means that might does not
61
make right. The protection and preservation of resources may be as
Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 NEB. L. REV. 658,
701-02, 740 (1995) (arguing that economic efficiency is the core of a reasonable judicial decision
and that courts should balance the value of what is obtained versus the value of what is
sacrificed); Smith, supra note 51, at 967-68 (observing that nuisance lawsuits may be resolved
using a cost-benefit approach).
56. See generally supra note 55. See also Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873
(N.Y. 1970) (declining to enjoin the disturbing activities of a cement factory due to the
investment of the cement company in its facility and the economic benefits to the community);
Smith, supra note 51, at 968 (noting that dependence on economic considerations may lead to
the placement of liability on the cheapest cost avoider).
57. Id. at 969.
58. See Jeffrey A. Berger, Efficient Wireless Tower Siting: An Alternative to Section
332(C)(7) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 83, 110-11
(2004) (discussing causes of action based on aesthetic nuisances); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The
Three Economies: An Essay in Honor of Joseph Sax, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411, 417-20 (1998)
(offering a comparison of a marketplace economy with an economy of nature).
59. See supra note 58. This also might include the public trust doctrine under which it is
recognized that private land use should be burdened by the community’s interest in its use and
enjoyment. Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Note, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and
Physical Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 422 (2005).
60. The civic economy includes societal concerns. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and
the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1433 (1993) (discussing the Lucas decision and the economy of nature); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study,
Practice, and Societal Governance in Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 369 (1999) (discussing the civic-societal economy as one that
considers societal concerns that exist beyond the elements of a marketplace economy).
61. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial
Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 809 (2001) (advancing the
argument that a majority cannot make an immoral, unfair, or unjust rule fair or acceptable). In
a similar manner, reliance on economic profit to justify a rule may be misplaced. Id.
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important to our future as current economic well-being.62 Our society
is more than a marketplace driven by economic forces, as an over63
dependence on market forces may be adverse to our quality of life.
Given that nuisance law balances equities, it ought to account for
considerations beyond economics.64 It follows that anti-nuisance
legislation should be based on additional, noneconomic factors.
Indeed, objectives include the protection of land resources and the
production of foodstuffs.65 Two economies have been offered to
supplement the economic-based marketplace economy; the
66
“economy of nature” and the “civic economy.” Although all three
economies overlap to some degree, their distinctions explain why a
new paradigm is being advanced to supplement right-to-farm laws.
B. Additional Economies
The economy of nature views lands from an ecological
67
perspective consisting of systems defined by their function. Land
ownership involves a custodial role whereby landowners have
68
obligations to non-landowners. Property rights accompanying land
ownership involve the consideration of both the owner’s and the
community’s interests.69 Under the economy of nature, land consists
of an intricate complex of living, geophysical systems defined by their
70
71
function. Land, in its unaltered state, performs important services.

62. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Versus Unsustainable Propositions, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 449, 474 (2002) (arguing that laws are necessary for the improvement of the
quality of life).
63. See Ross, supra note 27, at 7-8 (concluding that the marketplace economy allows for
the impairment of natural resources and environmental amenities).
64. This might include aesthetic and historic values. See, e.g., Stephen Christopher Unger,
Note, Ancient Lights in Wrigleyville: An Argument for the Unobstructed View of a National
Pastime, 38 IND. L. REV. 533, 552-60 (2005) (discussing the application of nuisance law to
preserving views).
65. Grossman & Fischer, supra note 1, at 111 (noting that right-to-farm laws were intended
to preserve farmland); Hand, supra note 1, at 328 (noting that right-to-farm laws, in conjunction
with other programs, can assist in preserving farmland); Thomas B. McNulty, Comment, The
Pennsylvanian Farmer Receives No Real Protection From the Pennsylvania Right to Farm Act, 10
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 81, 88 (2001) (observing continued food production from farmlands as
being a significant objective of right-to-farm laws).
66. Plater, supra note 60, at 362-74.
67. Plater, supra note 58, at 419 (criticizing classification of lands based on manmade
boundaries).
68. See Sax, supra note 60, at 1451 (claiming that contemporary land use management has
incorporated the notion that property owners have obligations “to protect natural services”).
69. Id. at 1453 (addressing the “American experience with navigable waters”).
70. Id. at 1442; Plater, supra note 58, at 429.
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It also intersects and interacts with two other economies: the
marketplace and civic economies.72 Considerations, including the
absorption of wastes, mean the economy of nature involves
externalities that may not be measured in traditional economic
terms.73
The civic economy, sometimes called the civic-societal
economy,74 extends beyond the marketplace economy to cover
externalized costs, including resources, energy, inputs, outputs,
values, qualities, and consequences of the life and welfare of human
society.75 While the importance of externalized costs has long been
recognized, economic and political pressures often result in many of
76
these external factors being marginalized. The significance of the
civic economy is that nuisance law based primarily on a marketplace
economy will not be giving adequate consideration to externalities
and the quality of life.77
Turning to anti-nuisance protection, right-to-farm laws are based
mainly on a marketplace economy whereby the capital investments in
infrastructural components of business activities justify an exception
78
to nuisance law. The laws generally do not separate the economic
factors concerning land resources from business interests so that both
land and businesses are treated in a similar fashion.79 In an eagerness
to protect agribusiness interests against nuisance lawsuits, some rightto-farm laws granted so much protection that they offended

71. Sax, supra note 60, at 1442 (observing that “forests regulate the global climate, marshes
sustain marine fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil in place”).
72. Id. at 429.
73. Id. See also Jerry Ellig, The Economics of Regulatory Takings, 46 S.C. L. REV. 595,
596-604 (1995) (discussing externalities as the failure to consider the costs or benefits of
individuals’ actions on other people due to poorly enforced property rights).
74. Plater, supra note 60, at 368.
75. Plater, supra note 58, at 430.
76. See id. (maintaining that externalized costs are often “overlooked in the day-to-day
economic and political pressures of the marketplace”).
77. The emphasis of the marketplace economy on profits overshadows or emasculates the
consideration of noneconomic values. For a discussion on the application of nuisance law
beyond the marketplace economy, see Unger, supra note 64.
78. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Bowen v. Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860,
861 (Miss. 1992) (noting an investment of $640,000 in a cotton gin before evaluating the
applicability of a right-to-farm law).
79. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 1(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006) (offering
protection to facilities and appurtenances at agricultural operations so that the right-to-farm
laws protect more than land).
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constitutional parameters.80 Challenges to other right-to-farm laws
may be expected, as they may go too far in adversely affecting
81
neighboring property owners.
This failure to distinguish between land resources and business
interests is important due to the services and resources provided by
82
Land is finite, takes thousands of years to develop,83 and
land.
provides different externalities than businesses.84 Rural lands often
have positive externalities in the form of open space, wildlife habitat,
scenic views, protection against flooding, and areas to absorb
pollutants.85 The total positive values of these externalities are
86
generally not factored into the price of land.
More important, the positive externalities of land may be lost
87
when structures such as homes or commercial development are built.
The ability to use land in the future for agronomic production may

80. Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998) (finding a taking);
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 185 (Iowa 2004) (finding a violation of the
inalienable rights clause of the state constitution).
81. See supra note 24 (noting challenges to other state right-to-farm laws, although none
were found to offend constitutional requirements).
82. See Robert J. Johnston, James J. Opaluch, Thomas A. Grigalunas & Marisa J.
Mazzotta, Estimating Amenity Benefits of Coastal Farmland, 32 GROWTH & CHANGE 305, 31621 (2001) (identifying three categories of nonmarket values related to farmland: location
dependent use values, non-location dependent use values, and non-use values).
83. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, FARMLAND INFO. CTR., FACT SHEET: WHY SAVE
FARMLAND? 1 (2003), available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/28562/Why_Save_
Farmland_1-03.pdf (relating American farmland to our economic well-being).
84. Land provides open space while businesses involving buildings do not. See Randall S.
Rosenberger & John B. Loomis, The Value of Ranch Open Space to Tourists: Combining
Observed and Contingent Behavior Data, 30 GROWTH & CHANGE 366, 378 (1999) (noting
studies reporting positive benefits associated with open space and concluding that the land
allocation market may not be efficient).
85. AM. FARMLAND TRUST, supra note 83, at 2-3 (arguing that the country’s farmland is at
risk because of conversion to development). See also George Boody, Bruce Vondracek, David
A. Andow, Mara Krinke, John Westra, Julie Zimmerman & Patrick Welle, Multifunctional
Agriculture in the United States, 55 BIOSCIENCE 27, 27 (2005) (noting that maintaining
landscape structure, preserving biodiversity, and contributing to the socio-economic viability of
rural areas are beneficial externalities of agriculture).
86. See Stephen N. Wheeler, The Evolution of Urban Form in Portland and Toronto:
Implications for Sustainability Planning, 8 LOC. ENV’T 317, 326 (2003) (noting the externalities
associated with sprawl are significant factors not reflected in land prices).
87. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 496 (2003) (advancing a
centralized system for natural resource preservation in response to the inability of local decision
makers to internalize beneficial externalities); Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework
for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 880 (2003) (observing that
developed parcels impose environmental costs on neighboring undeveloped parcels).
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also not be incorporated into its marketplace value.88 Another
concern is that the use of prime farmland for development causes the
89
country to rely on inferior lands for agricultural production.
Furthermore, the loss of farmland may adversely affect neighboring
farmers and their ability to continue with their agronomic activities.90
This suggests that greater attention might be given to assure
proportionality between ecosystem needs and the institutions
employed in a market-based economy.91 This does not involve the
subjugation of property rights to ecology, but rather that ecology
enters the equation for balancing rights among stakeholders.92
Through an anti-nuisance paradigm incorporating elements of the
economy of nature, undeveloped land resources might be offered
greater protection against market forces that fail to incorporate longterm economic and societal benefits offered by farmland, forests, and
natural areas.93

88. See Richard P. Greene & John Stager, Rangeland to Cropland Conversions as
Replacement Land for Prime Farmland Lost to Urban Development, 38 SOC. SCI. J. 543, 554
(2001) (concluding that as farmland is converted to other uses, less-sustainable lands are
employed for agricultural production); David L. Szlanfucht, Note, How to Save America’s
Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 337 (1999) (observing that reductions
in acreages of farmland are felt in local communities).
89. See Rutherford H. Platt, The Farmland Conversion Debate: NALS and Beyond, 37
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 433, 441 (1985).
90. See Szlanfucht, supra note 88, at 337 (discussing the loss of farmland and its effects on
neighboring property).
91. See Erik C. Martini, Comment, Wisconsin’s Milldam Act: Drawing New Lessons from
an Old Law, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (discussing efforts to remove dams on rivers in
Wisconsin and that the allocation of property rights ought to consider ecology).
92. Id.; Sax, supra note 60, at 1454.
93. The preservation of land was an objective of early right-to-farm legislation. See supra
note 4 and accompanying text. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (2001) (enunciating the
objective of preserving farmland “for the production of food and other agricultural products.”).
While the preservation of undeveloped land remains the objective for some right-to-farm laws,
others were revised to add business activities. The original Georgia right-to farm law adopted in
1980 covered agricultural and farming operations, places, establishments and facilities. 1980 Ga.
Laws, p. 1253, §§ 1-2. Subsequently, the Georgia right-to-farm law was amended to protect:
(E) The production and keeping of honeybees, the production of honeybee products,
and honeybee processing facilities;
(F) The production, processing, or packaging of eggs or egg products;
(G) The manufacturing of feed for poultry or livestock;
(H) The rotation of crops, including without limitation timber production;
(I) Commercial aquaculture
(J) The application of existing, changed, or new technology, practices, processes, or
procedures to any agricultural operation; and
(K) The operation of any roadside market.
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(3) (1997 & Supp. 2006).
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II. DEVELOPING ANTI-NUISANCE PROTECTION FOR UNDEVELOPED
LANDS
Activities occurring on farmlands, forests, and natural areas may
create conflicts with neighboring property owners.94 Prominent
objectionable activities for agriculture involve odors from animal
feeding operations.95 Aerial spraying of herbicides96 and logging
97
constitute forestry practices that may irk neighbors. Accumulated
98
99
100
brush, invasive species, and insect infestations on lands that are
natural areas may cause annoyances that lead to nuisance lawsuits.101
Many residential property owners feel they should not have to bear
the inconveniences accompanying agricultural and silvicultural
production.102 To address these nuisance concerns, an “Undeveloped
Lands Protection Act” (ULPA) is proposed (see Appendix 2).
ULPA is modeled after right-to-farm laws but is limited to providing
protection against nuisance lawsuits involving undeveloped lands.103

94. See Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So. 2d 909, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990) (involving a conflict concerning odors from liquid poultry manure); Herrin v. Opatut, 281
S.E.2d 575, 576 (Ga. 1981) (considering odors from a poultry operation); Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d
922, 925 (Idaho 2000) (considering the expansion of a hog operation); Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d
1352, 1356 (Idaho 1995) (considering odors from a cattle feedlot); Laux v. Chopin Land Assoc.,
550 N.E.2d 100, 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (considering odors from a hog operation); Flansburgh
v. Coffey, 370 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Neb. 1985) (considering the construction of a hog
confinement building); Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 34 (Tex. 2003) (alleging noise
and flies); Trickett v. Ochs, 838 A.2d 66, 69 (Vt. 2003) (alleging noise, light glare, and traffic).
95. See supra note 94.
96. See Anderson v. Minnesota, 693 N.W.2d 181, 192 (Minn. 2005) (alleging that the state’s
use of pesticides on poplar groves created a private nuisance).
97. See Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc’y, 111 P.3d 257, 258 (Wash.
2005) (alleging that clear-cutting a slope was a nuisance due to the increased potential of an
avalanche).
98. See Jeffrey P. Cohn, Tiff over Tamarisk: Can a Nuisance Be Nice, Too?, 55 BIOSCIENCE
648, 653 (2005) (noting that accumulations of woody materials from tamarisk trees provided fuel
for wildfires).
99. See id. at 650 (reporting efforts to remove buffelgrass, an invasive weed, because the
species causes wildfires to burn very hot and spread to additional areas).
100. See Fox v. Cheminova, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 160, 175 (E.D. N.Y. 2005) (declining to
grant defendants summary judgment with respect to a public nuisance claim based on the
spraying of pesticides to control the West Nile Virus); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’Ship,
952 P.2d 610, 614 (Wash. 1998) (alleging an infestation of flies at an animal feedlot constituted a
nuisance); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(alleging a nuisance involving the release of a chemically destructive spray into the atmosphere
to control an infestation of Mediterranean fruit flies).
101. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
102. See generally supra note 94.
103. See generally ULPA, tits. I-VII, infra app. 2. Undeveloped lands refer to real property
consisting of acreages of land and/or water used as farmlands, forests, and natural areas.
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The distinction involves the exclusion of business activities that are
not necessary for the stewardship of land or its productive capacity.104
While ULPA differentiates activities relating to the use of land
from business activities, it is not intended to downplay the importance
of business activities to economically beneficial land-use.105 Other
mechanisms, however, are already available to support such business
activities, including existing right-to-farm laws, tax incentives,
conservation easements, purchasing development rights, and
transferring development rights.106 ULPA supplements these other
mechanisms to offer an enhanced nuisance defense to undeveloped
lands. By excluding business activities, the statutory defense applies
in fewer situations and thus can go further in using a state’s police
power to re-balance the equities among neighbors with conflicting
land uses.107
Under ULPA, the economy of nature supports
additional protection solely for undeveloped lands.108
Practices to improve the productive capacity of lands, structures for educational purposes, and
efforts to preserve archaeological and cultural resources are permitted. See tit. III(G), infra
app. 2.
104. The division of business activities from lands mirrors the division of economic
incentives from land preservation. Rather than focusing on the economic viability of business
activities, ULPA seeks to stop nuisance lawsuits that interfere with the use of undeveloped land.
See tit. II, infra app. 2. See also Alterman, supra note 30, at 222, 238 (contrasting European land
preservation to the use of economic incentives to preserve farmland in the United States).
105. Business activities are important to land but are more appropriately governed by
existing nuisance provisions, including right-to-farm laws.
106. See Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future Directions, 22 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 419, 422-57 (2002) (discussing agricultural zoning as a major player among programs to
save farmland); Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to Professor
Richardson, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 371, 393-98 (2005) (discussing the preservation of
farmlands within the context of interfering with private property rights); Theodore A. Feitshans,
PDRs and TDRs: Land Preservation Tools in a Universe of Voluntary and Compulsory Land
Use Planning Tools, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 329 (2002) (discussing transfer of development
rights as a means to preserve farmland); Elisa Paster, Preservation of Agricultural Lands
Through Land Use Planning Tools and Techniques, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 283-308 (2004)
(discussing regulatory options that might be used to preserve farmland); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr.,
Downzoning Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59, 75-90 (2003)
(discussing who should pay for diminished values of lands preserved as farmlands); Jeanne S.
White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing
Its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113, 143 (1998) (opining a need to balance
farmland preservation with urban growth). See also Szlanfucht, supra note 88, at 343-52
(discussing methods to save farmland).
107. See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 113 (observing that right-to-farm laws were passed when
agricultural production was quite different and that the laws might not be appropriate for the
size of modern operations); Walker, supra note 15, at 461 (noting differences in the size of
agricultural operations and suggesting that these structural changes alter the justifications for
right-to-farm laws).
108. See supra notes 67-93 and accompanying text (delineating the economy of nature).
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ULPA consists of seven sections: the legislative purpose,
protection, definitions, exceptions, retained rights, preemption of
109
The provisions are
local ordinances, and litigation expenses.
adapted from right-to-farm laws and directed toward nuisances that
occur on undeveloped lands.110 ULPA is not intended to replace
right-to-farm laws; rather, it provides a supplemental defense for
111
qualifying property owners against nuisance actions.
A. Legislative Purpose
To delineate what is intended and to define legitimate
governmental objectives, ULPA sets forth a legislative purpose.112
Several issues are incorporated into the statement describing the act’s
objectives. The first legislative directive delineates a policy of
encouraging the use and improvement of the state’s farmlands,
forests, and natural areas while simultaneously conserving and
protecting these resources.113 As described in title I(A), these lands
offer important services and are irreplaceable resources of statewide
114
Given the nature of the natural resources being
importance.
protected, the act contributes to the general benefit of people’s health
and welfare.115
A second aspect of ULPA’s purpose is to enhance the use of
undeveloped lands for outdoor recreational activities, scenic vistas,
and ecological and natural resources.116 Title I(B) observes that open

109. See ULPA, tits. I-VII, infra app. 2 (text of the proposed act).
110. The intent is to protect land resources: lands that have not been developed or have
been developed with a minimum of permanent structures that interfere with agricultural,
recreational, or open space land uses. See tit. I, infra app. 2.
111. The act would be of special assistance in states where a right-to-farm law was found to
offend constitutional provisions. See See Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 321
(Iowa 1998); Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 175-77 (Iowa 2004) (finding right-tofarm laws unconstitutional).
112. Tit. I, infra app. 2 (incorporating ideas from several right-to-farm laws, including the
Pennsylvania law, 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (stating that the law’s
purpose is to conserve and encourage the protection of agriculture land)).
113. Id.
114. Tit. I(A), infra app. 2 (mirroring the legislative purpose of Kansas’ right to farm law).
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3201 (2001) (encouraging agricultural production).
115. Id. (adopting a statement that the preservation of agriculture will serve citizens’ best
interests from right-to-farm laws in Florida and New Jersey). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
823.14 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-2 (West 1998).
116. Tit. I(B), infra app. 2 (listing purposes delineated by the Vermont right-to-farm law).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5751 (2002 & Supp. 2006) (stating that agicultural activities
preserve the state’s resources and landscape while contributing to tourism and the general
health and welfare of the people).
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fields, pastures, forests, and natural areas are important to tourism
and the quality of life of people in the state.117 Forest lands may be
118
important to an area’s economic and ecological health.
Undeveloped lands may cleanse common water and air resources.119
This is why efforts should be made to limit urban encroachment, the
development and construction of structures, and the paving of areas
with impervious surfaces.120 Simultaneously, the legislative purpose
acknowledges the lack of adequate and informed consideration of
natural resources, their relationship to the state’s economy, and the
need to sustain activities on undeveloped lands.121
Title I(C) of ULPA sets forth a legislative purpose concerning
122
urban encroachment and the development of physical structures.
These activities result in fragmentation that diminishes the long-term
ability of the land and appurtenant parcels to be maintained in
natural productive uses, which may lead to the loss of resources.123
Fragmentation and the development of structures also interfere with
the long-term use of undeveloped lands because, as farm and forest

117. See id.
118. Donna L. Erickson, Robert L. Ryan & Raymond De Young, Woodlots in the Rural
Landscape: Landowner Motivations and Management Attitudes in a Michigan (USA) Case
Study, 58 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 101, 101 (2002) (finding that aesthetics and environmental
protection were more significant than economics for maintaining woodlots).
119. See Michael D. Jawson, Evert Byington, Dale Bucks, Mark Weltz & Robert Wright,
East, or West–Suiting Farms to Their Environments, 53 AGRIC. RES., Aug. 2005 at 2, 2 (noting
that agriculture can provide ecological services); Keith L. Olenickm, Urs P. Kreuter & J.
Richard Conner, Texas Landowner Perceptions Regarding Ecosystem Services and Cost-sharing
Land Management Programs, 53 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 247, 247-48 (noting ecological services
performed by rangelands).
120. This is not to say that limits on areas of impervious surfaces are universally considered
a good idea. See Jonathan E. Jones, T. Andrew Searles, Elizabeth A. Fassman, Edwin E.
Herricks, Ben Urbonas & Jane K. Clary, Urban Storm-Water Regulations–Are Impervious Area
Limits a Good Idea?, 131 J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING 176, 178 (2005) (chastising limits on
impervious surfaces because they often create “more significant environmental problems”).
121. Tit. I(B)(3), infra app. 2 (adopting ideas from a Florida law delineating a policy for
agricultural production). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001(6) (West 2003) (stating that the
lack of informed consideration has caused problems for agricultural production).
122. Tit. I(C), infra app. 2.
123. Tit. I(C)(1), infra app. 2. See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001) (stating “that
agricultural activities conducted on farmland in urbanizing areas are often subjected to nuisance
lawsuits, and that such suits encourage and even force the premature removal of the lands from
agricultural uses, and in some cases prohibit investments in agricultural improvements.”); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(4) (1998) (postulating “[t]hat conflicts between agricultural and urban land
uses threaten to force the abandonment of agricultural operations and the conversion of
agricultural resources to non-agricultural land uses, whereby these resources are permanently
lost to the economy and the human and physical environments of the state.”).
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lands are developed, fragmentation begets fragmentation.124 When
owners of undeveloped land sell parcels for development, remaining
lands become scattered and are more likely to experience annoyances
and interferences.125 Urbanization results in the loss of more land
than is incorporated in urban land uses and often diminishes the
126
quality of nearby water resources.
Urban development next to farmlands, forests, and natural areas
127
tends to create conflicts that threaten the demise of these resources.
Title I(C)(2) notes that the urbanization of an area may lead to the
demise of important natural resources.128 Certain activities necessary
129
to the use of agricultural and forestry lands are not always pleasant.
Pesticides and herbicides may be used and neighbors may fear that
the poisons will adversely affect their health.130 Fertilization with
131
Natural areas may
animal manure may result in offensive odors.
accumulate plant undergrowth that creates a fire hazard to
neighboring homes and structures,132 and controlled burns may be

124. Rutherford V. Platt, Global and Local Analysis of Fragmentation in a Mountain Region
of Colorado, 101 AGRIC., ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 207, 217 (2004) (analyzing changes in
fragmentation of urban development between 1985 and 1999).
125. Elizabeth Brabec & Chip Smith, Agricultural Land Fragmentation: The Spatial Effects
of Three Land Protection Strategies in the Eastern United States, 58 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN.
101, 101 (2002) (discussing issues accompanying agricultural land fragmentation).
126. Bryan C. Pijanowski, Bradley Shellito, Snehal Pithadia & Konstantinos Alexandridis,
Forecasting and Assessing the Impact of Urban Sprawl in Coastal Watersheds Along Eastern
Lake Michigan, 7 LAKES & RESERVOIRS: RES. & MGMT. 271, 282 (2002) (employing a model to
analyze urban-use changes in Michigan and analyzing data to show the impairment of
watersheds and loss of riparian habitats as areas urbanize).
127. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(3)-(4) (1998) (citing conflicts between traditional
agricultural land uses and urban land uses as justification for the Rhode Island right-to-farm
law); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.300 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (observing that nuisance
lawsuits in urbanizing areas may lead to the “premature removal of the lands from agricultural
uses and timber production.”). Alternatively, the availability of off-farm employment may lead
farmers to opt for non-farm occupations and the reversion of farmland to forest land. Kristi
MacDonald & Thomas K. Rudel, Sprawl and Forest Cover: What is the Relationship?, 25
APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 67, 75 (2005) (discussing urban sprawl and the loss of forest cover).
128. Infra app. 2.
129. See generally supra note 94 (identifying various nuisance cases involving objectionable
activities).
130. Macias v. California, 897 P.2d 530, 531 (Cal. 1995) (alleging damages from helicopter
spraying of the insecticide malathion); Adkins v. California, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 61 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (alleging damages from hanging traps in a pest eradication program).
131. Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So.2d 909, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(noting that the Florida right-to-farm law was to protect established farmers from “sprawling
urban development”).
132. See Cohn, supra note 98, at 653 (discussing an exotic species of tree that provides fuel
for wildfires that kills native vegetation).
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advocated to burn undergrowth creating a nuisance to neighboring
lands.133 The anti-nuisance protection seeks to safeguard the longterm ability of lands and appurtenant parcels to be maintained in
134
natural productive uses.
Finally, ULPA’s purpose notes in title I(D) that the overriding
purpose of the act is to limit the circumstances under which
135
farmlands, forests, and natural areas may be deemed a nuisance.
Neighbors resort to nuisance lawsuits to stop the annoying activities.
If the activities are enjoined, the inability to employ a practice may
force the premature demise of the current productive capacities.136
ULPA intends to limit interferences with the inherent agronomic
137
qualities and ecological values of the state’s undeveloped lands.
B. The Protection
Title II delineates the protection offered by the ULPA.138
Activities needed for the viable use of farmlands, forests, and natural
139
areas are permitted to continue. Conditions commonly associated
with these parcels need to be accepted by people who locate nearby
despite their objectionableness.140 This protection is important to
owners of undeveloped lands because it discourages incompatible

133. See J. Morgan Varner, III, Doria R. Gordon, Francis E. Putz & J. Kevin Hiers,
Restoring Fire to Long-Unburned Pinus palustris Ecosystems: Novel Fire Effects and
Consequences for Long-Unburned Ecosystems, 13 RESTORATION ECOLOGY 536, 541 (2005)
(advocating restoring and maintaining southeastern pine ecosystems); Sharon Levy, Rekindling
Native Fires, 55 BIOSCIENCE 303, 304 (2005) (noting the value of controlled burns in restoring
native habitats).
134. Tit. I(C), infra app. 2. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001) (citing “the premature
removal of the lands from agricultural uses”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-2(4) (1998) (expressing
concern about “the conversion of agricultural resources to non-agricultural land uses” and the
permanent loss of resources).
135. Tit. I(D), infra app. 2 (adopting a legislative purpose from similar provisions in
numerous right-to-farm laws including HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-1 (LexisNexis 2000),
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4501 (2001), 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (West 2002), N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 47-9-2 (LexisNexis 1999), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-45-10(3) (1987 & Supp. 2005)).
136. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-45-10(2) (1987 & Supp. 2005) (noting the problem of
agricultural facilities being forced to cease production).
137. Tit. I(D), infra app. 2. See Lichtman v. Nadler, 426 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980) (rejecting a claim that stagnant water was a nuisance due to mosquitoes and unpleasant
odors).
138. Tit. II, infra app. 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. tit. II(A). See also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933(2)(c) (2005) (declaring that “[p]ersons
who locate on or near an area zoned for farm or forest use must accept the conditions
commonly associated with living in that particular setting.”).
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land uses from moving into the area.141 After a short policy
declaration, ULPA sets forth three different provisions for protection
of land resources: (1) a statute of limitations, (2) a rebuttable
presumption that activities are not a nuisance and (3) an affirmative
defense to nuisance actions involving coming to the nuisance.142
First, title II(A) specifies a state policy that activities are to
continue on lands covered by the act.143 By referring to the conditions
at the particular setting, ULPA tells people that they should expect
144
activities that are consistent with the setting. People living next to
crop lands should expect annoyances from land cultivation and
145
Timber harvesting in forests will involve
harvesting activities.
logging activities accompanied by negative externalities that
adversely affect neighbors.146 People with farmland, forestry areas,
and natural areas should be able to allow natural vegetation including
147
Under ULPA, plaintiffs are stopped from
weeds to grow.

141. The significance of limiting non-agricultural land uses is that there will be fewer
pressures to develop or sell land. See Brett Zollinger & Richard S. Krannich, Factors
Influencing Farmers’ Expectations to Sell Agricultural Land for Non-Agricultural Uses, 67
RURAL SOC. 442, 459 (2002) (noting that changes in land use may encourage a farmer to sell
land for non-agricultural purposes).
142. Tit. II(B)-(D), infra app. 2. See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit.12, § 5753 (2002 & Supp. 2006)
(establishing a rebutable presumption that a prescribed activity is not a nuisance); 3 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 954 (West 1995 & Supp. 2006) (establishing a one year statute of limitation for initiating
a nuisance action).
143. Tit. II(A), infra app. 2. See also OR. REV. STAT. § 30.933 (2005) (delineating the
protection of lands).
144. Tit. II(A), infra app. 2 (referencing particular settings [farmlands, forests, and natural
areas] to recognize that activities on farmlands may be different from those occurring on forests
and that the conditions only pertain to the individual setting).
145. See Marti Maguire, Caution: Farm Zone; Agricultural Districts Could Protect Farmers
from Newcomers Who Raise a Stink, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 10, 2005, at B1
(noting tractors kick up dust and create nuisances); Jane Hawes, Rural Relations: Talking
Across the Fence Helps Farmers, Newcomers Get Along, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), July 20,
2003, at 01B (noting a neighbor’s objections to the dust and dirt from a nearby cattle and hog
operation).
146. See P. Bérubé & F. Lévesque, Effects of Forestry Clear-cutting on Numbers and Sizes of
Brook Trout, Salvelinus fontinalis (Mitchill), in Lakes of the Mastigouche Wildlife Reserve,
Québec, Canada, 5 FISHERIES MGMT. & ECOLOGY 123, 133 (1998) (noting that logging may
cause the siltation of streams and decreased fishing stocks); Ansgar Kahmen & Erik S. Jules,
Assessing the Recovery of a Long-lived Herb Following Logging: Trillium ovatum Across a 424year Chronosequence, 210 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 107, 113-15 (2005) (observing that long
term biological diversity depends on logging practices).
147. But see Goodenow v. City of Maquoketa, 574 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Iowa 1998) (finding that
the city could enforce an ordinance requiring a landowner to mow grass and weeds in a city
right-of-way).
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maintaining nuisance lawsuits about activities or conditions that
ordinarily transpire on undeveloped lands.148
A case from Florida shows the need for this protection.149 In
Kupke v. Orange County, a county enforcement officer cited a farmer
for “operating an unauthorized ‘junkyard’ on his agricultural zoned
land because he ‘stored’ a bushhog, a bulldozer, a crane, a backhoe,
and various other equipment and materials outdoors. . . .”150 The
issue was whether the equipment said to constitute a nuisance was
protected by the anti-nuisance provisions of the Florida right-to-farm
law.151 For the county’s case, witnesses claimed the machinery created
a nuisance without addressing the question of whether the equipment
152
Moreover, at the hearing on the
was used for farming purposes.
citation, the defendant was not allowed to present testimony from
153
farmers about the nature of the equipment. In considering a writ of
certiorari, the appellate court quashed the lower decisions.154 The
matter was remanded to provide the defendant an opportunity to
show that “the challenged equipment has an agricultural use which
meets the policy expressed by the legislature” for maintaining the
production of agricultural commodities for food and fiber.155 ULPA’s

148. Tit. II(A), infra app 2. Like the right-to-farm laws, ULPA would be an affirmative
defense and some nuisance causes of action would continue to be viable. See id. tits. IV-V
(delineating exceptions to the defense).
149. Kupke v. Orange County, 838 So. 2d 598, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
150. Id. at 598-99.
151. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14(4) (West 2006)).
152. Kupke, 838 So. 2d at 599 (complaining about “contamination, fires, snakes and rats”).
153. Id. (thwarting efforts of the defendant to show that the equipment was being used for
farming purposes).
154. Id. at 599-600 (remanding the issue to the circuit court and the county code
enforcement board).
155. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001 (West 2003)). In addressing agricultural
production in Florida, the Legislature has declared that:
(1) It is the public policy of this state and the purpose of this act to achieve and
maintain the production of agricultural commodities for food and fiber as an essential
element for the survival of mankind.
....
. . .(3) A sound agricultural industry in this state requires the efficient and profitable
use of water and energy and many other natural, commercial, and industrial resources.
....
. . .(5) It is important to the health and welfare of the people of this state and to the
economy of the state that additional problems are not created for growers and
ranchers engaged in the Florida agricultural industry by laws and regulations that
cause, or tend to cause, agricultural production to become inefficient or
unprofitable. . . .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 604.001 (West 2003). Some of the provisions of this Florida law have been
incorporated in the legislative purpose of ULPA. See tit. I(B), infra app. 2.
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title II delineates anti-nuisance protection to sanction activities
associated with agricultural and forestry production.156
Simultaneously, ULPA contains an important qualification: the
activities must be conducted according to “generally accepted
practices.”157 This qualification sets a benchmark whereby unjustified
practices, and practices that deviate from the norm, are excluded
from coverage by the act.158 Further qualifications concerning
generally accepted activities are set forth in the definition of this
159
term.
To provide more protection than is offered by most right-to-farm
laws, ULPA’s title II(B) establishes a two-year statute of limitation
160
for nuisance actions on qualifying undeveloped lands. Four states
(Minnesota, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Texas) have adopted time
periods to serve as a period of limitation and defeat nuisance
actions.161 The two-year period, adapted from the Minnesota Right to
162
Farm Act, provides a limited time frame during which nuisance
claims can be brought against an operation protected by the statute.163
After the two-year window closes, a neighboring landowner is
164
precluded from bringing a nuisance action.

156. Tit. II, infra app. 2.
157. Id. tit. II(A). See also Walker, supra note 15, at 480-85 (discussing the “generally
accepted agricultural and management practices” as delineated by the Michigan right-to-farm
law).
158. See tit. II(A), infra app. 2. See Souza v. Lauppe, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 500 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997) (observing that activities conducted consistent with proper and accepted customs
were not a nuisance). See also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 165-4 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2005)
(requiring “generally accepted agricultural and management practices” for qualification under
the right-to-farm law); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006)
(requiring “generally accepted practices” to qualify for the exception to nuisance law).
159. See tit. III(D), infra app. 2.
160. Id. tit. II(B).
161. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), interpreted in
Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13001, *20-22
(D. Minn. July 25, 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(a) (2004), interpreted in Bowen v.
Flaherty, 601 So. 2d 860, 862-63 (Miss. 1992); 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 954(a) (West 1995 & Supp.
2006), interpreted in Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 956-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); TEX. AGRIC.
CODE ANN. § 251.004 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006), interpreted in Barrera v. Hondo Creek
Cattle Co., 132 S.W.3d 544, 548-49 (Tex. App. 2004).
162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
163. See tit II(B), infra app. 2.
164. See Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13001, at *20-22 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003) (interpreting the Minnesota right-to-farm law’s statute
of limitations).
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Third, ULPA’s title II(C) offers a rebuttable presumption that
activities are not a nuisance on lands covered by the act.165 This
presumption applies to all activities on these lands regardless of
166
In this
whether the activities predated neighboring land uses.
manner, ULPA supports and protects activities even though they
167
slightly interfere with neighboring properties. However, limitations
are provided in other provisions of the act. An activity needs to be
conducted according to generally accepted practices in order to
qualify for the protection of the act,168 and certain enumerated
activities do not qualify for the presumption.169 If a new activity is
unreasonable, the presumption can be overcome and nuisance law
170
would provide a resolution for the conflict.
Fourth, for individuals moving near existing parcels, ULPA’s
171
If an
title II(D) sets forth a “coming to the nuisance” doctrine.
activity was not a nuisance when commenced, and has continued for
one year prior to people moving next to the activity, the anti-nuisance
defense is available.172 This provision is important for protecting
investments in capital and labor used for farming and forestry
business pursuits.173 The exception must also be read in conjunction

165. Tit. II(C), infra app. 2 (adopting a rebuttable presumption from the Vermont right-tofarm statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5753(a) (2002 & Supp. 2006)).
166. Id. Simultaneously, the activities that were there first are further protected by the
coming to the nuisance doctrine delineated in part D of title II. Id. tit. II(D).
167. See generally id. tit. II. The presumption in ULPA’s title II(C) indicates that activities
should be excepted from nuisance even if they have not existed, but this may be overcome by
evidence to the contrary. Since nuisance involves a balancing of equities, the act would
recognize a legislatively espoused priority of safeguarding undeveloped lands. See id. tit. II.
168. Id. tit. II(A). See also id. tit. III(D) (defining “generally accepted practices”).
169. See id. tits. IV, V(A).
170. Id. tit. II(C). This is because not only does the presumption not apply, but the
affirmative defense is also not applicable because the coming to the nuisance provision does not
protect new activities. Id. tit. II(D). See also Trickett v. Ochs, 838 A.2d 66, 72-74 (Vt. 2003)
(finding that the rebuttable presumption did not preclude a nuisance action where there was not
urban encroachment).
171. Tit. II(D), infra app. 2. This doctrine has been adopted by many right-to-farm laws.
See Hand, supra note 1, at 307 (noting priority in usage is consistent with the coming to the
nuisance defense).
172. Tit. II(D), infra app. 2 (adopting a one-year time frame to define the coming to the
nuisance exception from several right-to-farm laws). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7(c) (1997
& Supp. 2006); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9(d)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
173. Cf. supra note 123. The coming to the nuisance defense will be important for activities
that started before changes in nearby land uses. In Vicwood Meridian Partnership’ship v. Skagit
Sand & Gravel, a farm in existence since the 1920s was composting poultry litter for the
production of mushrooms. 98 P.3d 1277, 1279 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). The defendant altered its
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with title IV of the act which requires conformity with all laws, no
maliciousness, and excludes activities that would be injurious to
174
public health or safety.
C. Definitions
ULPA sets forth seven definitions to enunciate the meanings of
175
key terms. Through the definition of activities, farmlands, forests,
generally accepted practices, manure, natural areas, and undeveloped
176
lands, parameters are given for the protection accorded by the act.
1. Activities
Activities are defined in two separate paragraphs: one for food
and crop production areas and the second for natural areas.177
Activities include conditions and pursuits associated with the
production of agricultural, aquacultural, and silvicultural products
and the management of the production areas for continued
178
agronomic objectives. To further delineate what types of activities
this might include, ULPA lists fertilizer application, weed and pest
control, planting, cultivating, reforesting, on-site composting,179
180
drainage, mowing, harvesting, land clearing, insect and disease
control, constructing ponds associated with farming or aquacultural
operations, thinning, fire protection, and fence maintenance.181 This

composting process and was sued by neighbors who had moved to the nuisance. Id. The court
found that the coming to the nuisance defense incorporated in the right-to-farm law protected
the defendant against the nuisance lawsuit. Id. at 1280-82 (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 7.48.300–.310 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005)). Similarly, ULPA incorporates the coming to
the nuisance doctrine in title II(D) to offer the protection to existing activities. Infra app. 2.
174. Tit. IV, infra app. 2. See also infra Part II.D (discussing the exceptions of ULPA’s
nuisance protection).
175. Tit. III, infra app. 2.
176. Id.
177. Id. tit. III(A)(1)-(2).
178. Id. tit. III(A)(1) (listing activities from the Washington state right-to-farm law, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.48.310(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005)).
179. However, bringing materials to the site for composting would be a business activity not
intended to be protected by the act. Tit. III(A)(1), infra app. 2. See also Johnson v. Compost
Prods., Inc., 731 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ill. Ap. Ct. 2000) (considering an allegation that a mushroom
composting business constituted a nuisance).
180. Flooding would constitute a nuisance under ULPA, tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2. Cf. Ditch
v. Hess, 292 N.W.2d 397, 398 (Iowa 1980) (observing that an interference with drainage causing
farmland to be unusable could constitute a continuing nuisance).
181. Tit. III(A)(1), infra app. 2 (listing activities from the Kentucky right-to-farm law, KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005), and permitted activities from Washington state
funding for recreation and wildlife, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79A.20.010(1) (West 2001)).
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list is not intended to be exhaustive of the activities that will be
covered.182 Furthermore, the text notes that an activity may be
accompanied by odors, noise, air particulates, use of chemicals, and
183
the lawful impairment of waters.
Due to the fact that natural areas may have quite different
activities from those occurring on lands specifically geared for the
production of crops, ULPA’s title III(A)(2) contains a separate
paragraph protecting conditions and pursuits associated with natural
184
Reference is made to activities involving the protection,
areas.
management, and development of scenic, outdoor recreational,
185
ULPA is
cultural, archaeological, and ecological resources.
intended to offer anti-nuisance protection for undeveloped lands
providing these resources.
2. Farmlands
“Farmlands” are defined to include parcels greater than ten acres
that are devoted primarily for the production of crops, livestock,
freshwater aquacultural, horticultural, or other agricultural
186
Areas of land, swampland, ponds, and small lakes
commodities.
may be included in the calculation of the requisite acreage size.187 A
parcel of less than ten acres suggests that the area is of an insufficient
188
size to constitute a meaningful, undeveloped land resource.
To give further direction to the definition of farmlands, a listing
of land uses is included, enumerating field crops, vineyards, orchards,
groves, vegetable and fruit crops, pastures, areas without roofed
structures for holding farm animals, water bodies for the production
of aquacultural products, ponds, small lakes, and forestry areas as

182. Id.
183. Id. (adopting the list of activities from the Connecticut right-to-farm law, CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-341(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006), and the Rhode Island right-to-farm law,
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2-23-5(a) (1998)).
184. Id. tit. III(A)(2). For example, natural water areas with excess nutrients and sediments
may allegedly create a nuisance. Steilacoom Lake Improvement Club v. Washington, No.
31676-5-II, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 1936, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (alleging that the
aquatic plant growth in a lake constituted a nuisance).
185. Tit. III(A)(2), infra app. 2 (adopting activities for preservation of natural areas from a
Washington statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.70.010 (West 2001)).
186. Id. tit. III(B) (adopting the ten-acre idea from the Nebraska right-to-farm law, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 2-4402(1) (2001)).
187. Id. (adopting the idea of including waters used for aquacultural production from the
Mississippi right-to-farm law, MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29(2)(a) (2004)).
188. Areas less than ten acres may be associated with urbanization and thus do not have
sufficient qualities to be considered as undeveloped lands. See supra note 186.
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acceptable land uses.189 The definition of farmlands also includes
appurtenant natural areas, which would include parcels that are not
190
readily incorporated into cultivated acreages.
3. Forests
ULPA’s title III(C) defines forests to mean parcels greater than
ten acres that are used in the production of timber and related fiber
crops.191 Forestry production activities include timber harvest, site
preparation, slash disposal including controlled burning, tree planting,
pre-commercial thinning, fertilization, animal damage control,
reasonable water resource management, insect and disease control in
forest land, and any other generally accepted, reasonable, and
prudent practice normally employed in the management of the timber
resource for monetary profit.192 Through the definition of forests,
recognized forestry activities receive protection from nuisance
lawsuits.193
4. Generally Accepted Practices
One of the difficulties in exempting practices from nuisance
lawsuits is defining what practices are exempted. While malicious
194
and injurious practices are excepted, there remain other practices
that are not reasonable and should not be protected from nuisance
lawsuits. A definition of “generally accepted practices” is provided in
ULPA to provide guidance in discerning the coverage of the act.195
Generally accepted practices mean reasonable and prudent methods
for the activities being conducted and apply to activities used in a
county or contiguous county in which a nuisance claim is asserted.196
189. Tit. III(B), infra app. 2. This supports the objective of protecting undeveloped lands.
190. Id. Farms may have small parcels of less than ten acres that are woodlands, corners
between fields, or buffers that can be considered to be part of the farmlands that merit antinuisance protection.
191. Id. tit. III(C) (adopting the ten-acre minimum as used for farmlands). The overlap of
this definition with farmlands is intentional; all agricultural and silvicultural crops are intended
to be within the protection afforded by the act.
192. Id. (adopting activities permitted under the Kentucky right-to-farm law, KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005)).
193. Id. However, a few activities are not protected. See id. tit. IV(B)(4) (prohibitng the
clear-cutting of forests).
194. Id. tit. IV(A)(1).
195. Id. tit. III(D) (adopting language for qualification from the Kentucky right-to-farm law,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(3) (West 2005)).
196. Id. (incorporating the idea of having generally accepted practices relate to counties
from the Minnesota right-to-farm law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 1(c) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006)).
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This limitation precludes practices from a divergent region of a state
from qualifying as generally accepted practices.
Generally accepted practices include those practices necessary
for the on-site production and preparation of agricultural or forestry
commodities, such as the operation of equipment, proper use of
pesticides, air and water quality control, noise control, fertilizer
application, labor practices, and crop protection methods.197 As
further clarifications, two presumptions are delineated. Practices that
are commonly or reasonably associated with agricultural production
are assumed to qualify as generally accepted practices.198 Activities in
conformity with federal, state, and local laws and regulations are
presumed to be conducted according to generally accepted
practices.199
5. Manure
One of the controversial activities involving agricultural
200
The
production and nuisance law is manure application to fields.
application of manure can be a nuisance, especially if the application
occurs at an inappropriate time or fails to conform with acceptable
practices.201 Simultaneously, the application of manure to fields is a
desired agronomic practice, as manure contributes to the fertility of
202
the soil by adding organic matter and nutrients. ULPA’s title III(E)
sets forth a definition for manure providing guidance for future
provisions of the act that distinguishes permitted manure application
to fields from other practices that remain subject to nuisance
lawsuits.203 “Manure” is defined to include organic matter from farm
197. Id. tit. III(D)(1) (incorporating ideas on practices from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1C-9 (West
1998 & Supp. 2006) and N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 308(1)(b) (McKinney 2004)).
198. Id. tit. III(D)(2) (adopting the presumption from the Colorado right-to-farm law,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102(1)(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2006)).
199. Id. (adopting the qualification from the right-to-farm laws from a number of states
including ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-112(B) (2005), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2-3202 (2001), and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-38-7(2) (2002)).
200. See supra note 94 (citing cases concerning odors).
201. Tits. IV(B)(3), V(B)(1), infra app. 2 (excepting animal waste lagoons and spray fields
from the protection offered by ULPA but protecting the application of manure to fields).
202. A.A. Araji ET AL., Efficient Use of Animal Manure on Cropland: Economic Analysis,
79 BIORESOURCE TECH. 179, 179-180 (2001) (noting that the use of animal manure for crop
production should be encouraged as it supplies nutrients and organic matter to the soil,
augments the soil’s water-holding capacity, and increases the soil’s fertility). See also Terence J.
Centner, EMPTY PASTURES: CONFINED ANIMALS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RURAL
LANDSCAPE 63 (2004) (noting that the application of manure to land for crop growth is a
recommended practice).
203. Tit. III(E), infra app. 2. See also id. tits. IV(B)(2)-(3), V(B).
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animals used as fertilizer in agriculture.204 Poultry litter is also defined
as involving excreted manure from avian species mixed with bedding
205
For the purposes of the act, manure includes poultry
material.
206
litter.
6. Natural Areas
“Natural areas” are defined as parcels greater than ten acres
207
which have retained their natural, undeveloped character.
These
areas would exclude cultivated fields and forests, but would include
forestry areas that consist of natural regeneration of trees.208
Moreover, natural areas do not have to be completely undisturbed as
they might include lands that are important in preserving
archaeological or cultural resources, ecosystems, flora, fauna,
geological, open space, natural historical, scenery, wildlife habitat,
wetlands, or similar features of scientific or educational value.209
7. Undeveloped Lands
An additional description of undeveloped lands of ten acres or
more is offered in title III(G) to categorize parcels that are afforded
protection from nuisance lawsuits.210 Undeveloped parcels include
lands used for farmlands, forests, and natural areas that may be used
for outdoor recreational activities, hunting, forestry, scenic views, and
ecological functions.211 Undeveloped lands cannot have any structure
used for human habitation, building used for confined animal
production, nor any building used for a commercial purpose that is
not directly related to use of the land as farmland, forest, or a natural
area.212
Outhouses, lean-to shelters, historical and educational
213
structures, and minor farm buildings are permitted on lands.

204. Id. tit. III(E).
205. Id. See also P. Pengthamkeerati ET AL., Soil Carbon Dioxide Efflux from a Claypan
Soil Affected by Surface Compaction and Applications of Poultry Litter, 109 AGRIC.,
ECOSYSTEMS & ENV’T 75, 77 (2005).
206. Tit. III(E), infra app. 2. When poultry litter is applied to land as a fertilizer, the issues
of smell and water contamination are similar to those created by the application of manure.
207. Id. tit. III(F) (adopting the ten-acre minimum as used for farmlands).
208. Id. Natural areas may overlap with forests, and both constitute undeveloped lands.
209. Id. (adopting ideas describing natural areas for a Washington land preservation statute,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 79.70.020 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006)).
210. Id. tit. III(G) (adopting the ten-acre minimum used for farmlands).
211. Id.
212. Id. This relates to the purpose of the act to protect lands in their unaltered state. The
provision attempts to allow expected utility or farm out-buildings that do not detract from the
preservation of lands. Simultaneously, the act does protect activities at buildings used for
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The intent of this definition is to include lands that retain
significant resource attributes. In some cases, undeveloped lands may
be accompanied by a building or paved area serving a business
need.214 Rather than disqualifying the undeveloped portion of the
parcel, nonqualifying buildings or paved areas on plots connected to
farmlands, forests, or natural areas may be deemed separate parcels
not covered by the act.215
D. Exceptions to the Protection
The broad coverage of activities on undeveloped lands may be
misinterpreted to cover some conditions that should not be exempted
from nuisance law.216 Therefore, ULPA’s title IV sets forth nine
exceptions that delineate activities for which there is no anti-nuisance
protection.217
The activities covered by these exceptions are
insufficiently related to the economy of nature or so onerous that
neighbors should retain their common law right of nuisance to seek
judicial relief.218
1. Nonapplication of the Act
The first group of four exceptions concerns situations where the
219
anti-nuisance protection accorded by ULPA does not apply.
Following right-to-farm laws, ULPA provides that any activity
conducted in a malicious, improper, or negligent manner does not

businesses or activities that do not need to be conducted on lands covered by the act. See id. tit.
IV(B)(1)-(2) (listing buildings as not being within the anti-nuisance protection afforded by
ULPA).
213. Id. tit. III(G) (allowing unobtrusive structures). The objective is to protect lands,
recognizing that a few minor structures may not notably detract from the resources associated
with the parcel.
214. For example, historic, educational, or scientific undeveloped areas may have buildings
for exhibits or rest rooms, and paved parking areas.
215. Tit. III(G), infra app. 2. Farmlands and other lands may be accompanied by residences,
barns, or other buildings. While the anti-nuisance protection of ULPA is not intended to apply
for the plots where these structures are located, ULPA is intended to apply to lands extending
from these structures.
216. Nuisance law is intended to be the norm, with the anti-nuisance defense of ULPA
limited to special situations.
217. Tit. IV, infra app. 2. As might be expected, these exceptions severely restrict the
coverage of the act.
218. Id. These ideas are taken from various right-to-farm laws and reported nuisance cases.
See infra Part D.1—2 (discussing the coverage of ULPA’s title IV, which disqualifies certain
onerous or unncessearcy activies from protection under the act).
219. Id. tit., IV(A).
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qualify for anti-nuisance protection.220 Allied with this exception is a
provision asserting that an activity not in conformity with federal,
state, and local law, ordinance, regulation (including a zoning
regulation), or permit issued by a governmental agency cannot claim
anti-nuisance protection.221 These exceptions should be important in
precluding undeserving activities from qualifying for the antinuisance defense.
A case from the state of Washington illustrates the need for an
222
exception regarding violations. In Gill v. LDI, plaintiffs, suing for
nuisance, alleged that defendant’s activities polluted waters flowing
223
In opposition to the’ right-to-farm law
into the plaintiffs’ pond.
224
defense, the court cited admitted violations of a permit issued
pursuant to the Clean Water Act.225 Under the right-to-farm law, a
nuisance that involves the violation of a permit requirement subjects
226
The anti-nuisance exception was not
the violator to damages.
intended to serve as a defense to nuisances by a defendant who fails

220. Tit. IV(A)(1), infra app. 2. See also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3 (West 2002)
(establishing that the anti-nuisance defense is not available “whenever a nuisance results from
the negligent or improper operation of any farm or its appurtenances.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.122.29(A) (1994) (providing the anti-nuisance defense is not available for negligent or improper
operations); Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farms, 834 F. Supp. 1410,
1419 & 1421 (W.D.N.Y. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 34 F.3d 114, 120-121 (2d Cir. 1994)
(noting the right-to-farm law required sound agricultural practices and that the defendants had
alleged improper manure application); Margaret Rosso Grossman, Biotechnology, Property
Rights and the Environment, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 234 (Supp. 2002) (noting that right-to-farm
laws often protect farmers only if their practices are not negligent or improper); Randall Wayne
Hanna, Right to Farm Statutes–The Newest Tool in Agricultural Land Preservation, 10 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 415, 430-31 (1982) (concluding the most common type of right-to-farm law normally
does not offer protection to the negligent conduct or improper operation of an agricultural
activity).
221. Tit. IV(A)(2), infra app. 2 (adopting this statement from right-to-farm laws). See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(a)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). See also Grossman &
Fischer, supra note 1, at 117 (observing the requirement of conformity with laws).
222. Gill v. LDI, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198-99 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding that the
defendant could not benefit from the right-to-farm statute because it had not engaged in “good
forestry practices” due to violation of water quality laws’).
223. Id. at 1191 (concerning water pollution from quarrying activities).
224. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300, 305 (West 1992
& Supp. 2006)).
225. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1198-99 (involving violations of a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System permit).
226. Id. at 1198 (citing Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 884-85 (Wash. 1998), which found that
the violation of a permit constituted a nuisance when it “unreasonably interferes with the use
and enjoyment of another’s property.”).
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to employ good practices.227 Violation of duly enacted regulatory
proscriptions shows the absence of good practices.228 Thus, the rightto-farm defense was not available.
While title IV(A)(2) supports the enforcement of local actions,
simultaneously, some type of limitation on interferences with
229
activities on undeveloped lands by local governments is needed.
Title VI addresses this issue by precluding local governments from
interfering with production and management activities on
undeveloped lands conducted according to generally accepted
practices.230 Differentiating between permitted local actions and
unpermitted local interferences with activities on undeveloped lands
is challenging. ULPA intends to preclude local governments from
enacting laws, ordinances, or regulations that interfere with
231
But, local
agricultural and forestry production activities.
governments can control activities such as the storage of abandoned
cars, worn tires, and other nuisance activities,232 as ULPA does not
offer protection to property owners who are not in compliance with
233
provisions concerning these types of nuisances.
ULPA’s title IV(A)(3) makes it clear that the act does not afford
a defense against any action regarding a diseased plant or animal or
234
harboring a pest that is injurious to human welfare or health.
227. Id. at 1200 (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300, .305 and noting the
failure of the defendant to engage in good practices). See also Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d
1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (interpreting that nonqualifying agricultural activities could be found to
be public nuisances despite the statutory defense of the Florida right-to-farm law).
228. Gill, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
229. Otherwise, local governments may pass ordinances or local laws that impede the
preservation of undeveloped lands.
230. See tit. IV, infra app. 2.
231. See id. See also infra notes 316-344 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Pfeiffer, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (D. Neb. 1998) (affirming action
by a city government to abate a nuisance consisting of wrecked or abandoned cars, unused
machinery, and other items).
233. Tit. IV(A)(2), infra app. 2, See also Northville Twp. v. Coyne, 429 N.W.2d 185, 187
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that although the defendant qualified for the anti-nuisance
defense of the state’s right-to-farm law, the defendant could be penalized for violating a local
building permit requirement).
234. Tit. IV(A)(3), infra app. 2. Cf. Altman v. Town of Amherst, 190 F.Supp. 2d 467, 468
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) (upholding a mosquito spraying program to control “nuisance and vector
mosquitoes”); Ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pac. Farming Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115, 119 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (affirming injunctive relief for a public nuisance that ordered the removal of citrus trees
infected with a virus); Gleaves v. Waters, 220 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(acknowledging the right to abate a public nuisance consisting of an invasion of Japanese
beetles); Kaso v. Ohio Dep’t of Health, 794 N.E.2d 776, 778, 784 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 2003) (finding the
department of health not liable for damages involving a program developed to combat a rabies
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Because ULPA does not affect governmental police-power actions to
control diseases and pests, efforts to control such on undeveloped
235
lands are not affected. Preventing the introduction of a disease or
pest is important for the continued viability of a land use.236 Cotton
production was decimated by the introduction of the boll weevil in
237
1892, and has cost our country more than $22 billion. Red fire ants
are estimated to cause more that $1 billion of damages per year in the
southern United States.238 Formosan termites cause a similar amount
239
More recent concerns about bovine spongiform
of damage.
encephalopathy (mad cow disease) illustrate the need to definitively
allow governments to take appropriate action to control diseases and
240
pests.

epidemic); Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found. Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 462 (Tex.
1997) (finding that the boll weevil constituted a public nuisance and “eradication of the boll
weevil is a proper subject for regulation by the State pursuant to its police power.”). But see
Dep’t Agric. & Consum. Serv. v. Polk, 568 So.2d 35, 40 n.4 (Fla. 1990) (finding the plants
infected with a bacterial disease did not create a nuisance so that the destruction of nearby
plants was a compensable taking).
235. State and federal governments faced with emergencies due to infestation of an insect
may take appropriate action that damages private property. Teresi v. California., 225 Cal. Rptr.
517 (Cal. Ct. App.. 1986) (considering an emergency consisting of an invasion by Mediterranean
fruit flies). Moreover, damages resulting from a police-power response to an emergency are
excepted from the constitutional requirement that compensation be paid for property taken for
public use. Id. at 518-19 (observing that property damage resulting from a valid exercise of the
police power to avoid an impending peril does not need to be compensated). This police-power
response is not absolute; rather, emergencies that are not extreme or those that lack necessity
may not justify a governmental invasion of property and, therefore, require compensation as a
“taking” of private property. See Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for
Environmental Purposes: The Takings Implications of Governmental-Authorized Aerial
Pesticide Spraying, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 88-93 (1999) (discussing how the aerial application
of pesticides to control an outbreak of Mediterranean fruit flies might constitute a taking).
236. David Pimentel et al., Environmental and Economic Costs of Nonindigenous Species in
the United States, 50 BIOSCIENCE 53, 58 (2000) (reporting that the European green crab has
caused the demise of the New England and maritime Canadian softshell clam industry with an
estimated loss of $44 million per year in economic returns).
237. James Coppedge & Robert M. Faust, Winning the Weevil War: Beating a $22 Billion
Bug, AGRIC. RES., Feb. 2003, at 2 (highlighting how researchers have achieved control over the
boll weevil).
238. Pimentel et al., supra note 236, at 57-58 (calculating damages from estimates from
Texas).
239. Id. at 58.
240. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MAD COW DISEASE: IMPROVEMENT IN THE
ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN U.S.
PREVENTION EFFORTS, GAO 02-183 (Jan. 2002) (recommending stronger enforcement
measures and increased inspections to preclude the introduction of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy); Editorial, Testing Madness, SCI. AM. 8, July 2004, at 8 (commenting that only
cattle older than 30 months should be tested for bovine spongiform encephalopathy).
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Title IV(A)(4) addresses conditions injurious to public health or
safety and excludes them from protection against nuisance lawsuits.241
Three categories of activities are enumerated. An improperly built or
improperly maintained septic tank, water closet, or privy is not
protected by the Act.242 Untreated or improperly treated human
waste, garbage, offal, dead animal or waste from a slaughtered animal
243
Dangerous waste materials and
remains subject to nuisance law.
gas which are harmful to human or animal life are excepted.244
ULPA’s text makes it clear that public health and safety laws and
245
ordinances based on preventing public nuisances are not affected.
2. Activities Subject to Nuisance Law
A second group of exceptions for the anti-nuisance protection
accorded by title IV(B) involves business activities that are not within
the economy of nature paradigm.246 It is felt that these activities are
not necessary for the protection of lands so that neighboring property
247
Rather,
owners should be burdened with associated nuisances.
these activities involve business choices that are appropriately
addressed by community standards, nuisance law, and land use
regulations.248
The initial business activity subject to nuisance law involves
activities in buildings and structures used for milling inputs,
241. Tit. IV(A)(4), infra app. 2 (adopting language from the New Hampshire right-to-farm
law, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:33 (2002), whereby the law is not applicable to any aspect of
an agricultural operation that is injurious to public health or safety).
242. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(a).
243. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(b).
244. Id. tit. IV(A)(4)(c) (adopting exceptions from the Florida right-to-farm law, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 823.14(4)(a)(1)-(4) (West 2006)).
245. Id. tit. IV(A). A case from Washington serves to show how the anti-nuisance exception
would be limited. Costello v. Weyerhauser Co., 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1746 (Wash. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 1998). Plaintiffs had alleged a nuisance for defendant’s failure to control hunters on its
property. Id. at *7. The issue involved the defendant taking appropriate action to keep
neighbors safe from hunting activities. Id. at *8. The court found that the plaintiff had
advanced facts to maintain a nuisance lawsuit. Id. at *16. Similarly, an allegation of a nuisance
based upon safety would not be precluded by ULPA. Tit IV(A)(4), infra app. 2.
246. Id. tit. IV(B).
247. Id. As an exception to nuisance law, the anti-nuisance protection should be limited to
deserving activities. The activities are those that normally occur on undeveloped lands, and
tend to exclude activities relating to business practices.
248. Id. A state’s nuisance law and anti-nuisance legislation already provide a resolution for
nuisance disputes involving business activities. All right-to-farm laws derogate common law
nuisance for qualifying agricultural business activities and a few laws derogate nuisance for nonagricultural business activities. See, e.g., 3 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-954 (limiting nuisance
protection to agricultural operations).
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manufacturing agricultural and forestry products, or processing
products.249 A case from Georgia involving a business which
250
manufactured utility poles from untreated logs shows why ULPA
declines to offer an anti-nuisance defense to businesses. In Roberts v.
Southern Wood Piedmont Co., a homeowner sued for relief from
251
noise and vibrations from the nearby manufacturing facility.
In
reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, the court noted the
homeowner had advanced a claim in nuisance.252 Allegations of
changes at the facility in 1980 causing noise and vibrations showed a
new unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s “use and
enjoyment of her property.”253 While a legislature may choose to
promote commercial and industrial activities, as occurs under many
right-to-farm laws, ULPA is intended to only protect natural
resources.254
Business activities involving the processing and
marketing of agricultural and forestry products do not qualify for the
255
anti-nuisance protections offered by ULPA.

249. Id. tit. IV(B)(1).
250. Roberts v. S. Wood Piedmont Co., 328 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
251. Id. at 392 (averring that the loading and unloading of logs caused the noise and
vibrations). While the facility had been existence for many years, it was the increase in the
noise and vibrations that led to the lawsuit. Id.
252. Id. at 393.
253. Id. (noting the Georgia right-to-farm law was not applicable because the law did not
cover the facility).
254. Tit. 1, infra app. 2. Actually, right-to-farm laws are mixed on protecting business
activities. A few protect businesses. Compare Erbrich Products Co. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850,
857 & 859-60 (Ind. Ct. App.. 1987) (finding a facility used for manufacturing bleach was
protected by an anti-nuisance statute), and Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 956 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999) (finding that a new poultry operation housing 122,000 laying hens qualified for the antinuisance protection afforded by the Pennsylvania right-to-farm law), with Trickett v. Ochs, 838
A.2d 66, 68-69 (Vt. 2003) (finding that new activities involving the storage and marketing of
apples were not protected by the Vermont right-to-farm law with respect to the plaintiffs’ prior
residential use).’
255. Tit. IV(B), infra app. 2.
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The next two provisions involve animal production.256 The
production of animals in buildings, feedlots, and pens at a
concentrated animal feeding operation, as defined by state law,
entails a business activity of a character quite different from the land
resources being afforded protection by ULPA.257 Likewise, the
disposal of animal waste via lagoons and spray fields are specialized
258
Neighbors
business responses that can be especially egregious.
should not have to accept the aggravating situations that accompany
these business activities, so ULPA provides that they remain subject

256. Id. tit. IV(B)(2)-(3). Problems associated with confined animal production have
received considerable attention. Cf. Charles W. Abdalla, The Industrialization of Agriculture:
Implications for Public Concern and Environmental Consequences of Intensive Livestock
Operations, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 190-91 (2002) (advocating greater regulatory
attention to jurisdictional boundaries for regulating animals); Theodore A. Feitshans & Kelly
Zering, Federal Regulation of Animal and Poultry Production Under the Clean Water Act:
Opportunities for Employing Economic Analysis to Improve Societal Results, 10 PENN ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 193, 212-15 (2002) (advocating regulations that consider social welfare and
efficiency); David R. Gillay, Oklahoma’s Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Act:
Balancing the Interests of Landowners with the Exponential Growth of the Hog Industry, 35
TULSA L.J. 627, 642-49 (2000) (analyzing one state’s regulations of concentrated animal feeding
operations); Michael Steeves, The EPA’s Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring
the Integrity of Our Nation’s Waters, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367 (2002) (discussing
problems with concentrated animal feeding operation regulations).
257. Infra App. 2, tit. IV(B)(2) (adopting a qualification in the Minnesota right-to-farm law
differentiating confined animal feeding operations, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19, subdiv. 2(c)(1)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006)). Regulating the size of a confined animal operation addresses the
issue of how much an operation may expand and still qualify for the protection of a right-tofarm law. See also Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817, 821-26 (Ill.App. Dist. 2003) (enjoining
defendants from constructing a hog confinement facility as a prospective nuisance given the
high probability that the facility would be a nuisance); Buchanan v. Simplot Feeders Ltd. P’ship,
134 Wash.2d 673, 681-85 (Wash. 1998) (observing that the plaintiffs had come to rangeland and
that the lagoon and spray field were developed later, creating a nuisance that was not protected
by the right-to-farm law)’. But see Crea v. Crea, 16 P.3d 922, 925 (Idaho 2000); Payne v. Skaar,
900 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Idaho 1995) (arguing that the expansion of a feedlot should be
protected by the right-to-farm law).’’
258. Tit. IV(B)(3), infra app. 2. The Act clarifies that lagoons and spray fields do not
qualify for anti-nuisance protection. The objectionable nature of lagoons and spray fields also
involve health issues. See Dana Cole et al., Concentrated Swine Feeding Operations and Public
Health: A Review of Occupational and Community Health Effects, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECTIVES 685, 685-96 (2000) (reviewing health issues associated with the swine industry);
ROBBIN MARKS, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS AND SPRAYFIELDS
THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 117-60 (2001), available at
http://www.nrdc.org/water/pollution/cesspools/cesspools.pdf; K.M. Thu, Public Health Concerns
for Neighbors of Large-Scale Swine Production Operations, 8 J. AGRIC. SAFETY & HEALTH 175,
176-82 (2002) (reporting health problems associated with the swine industry); Keynen J. Wall,
Knowing When To Say When To Hog Waste: Do State Lagoon Regulations Adequately Protect
Ground Water in Kansas?, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 118-19 (2001) (finding that animal
waste poses a threat to drinking water supplies).

01__CENTNER.DOC

Fall 2006]

2/6/2007 4:55 PM

UNDEVELOPED LAND PROTECTION

37

to nuisance law.259 Conversely, the production of animals at a facility
that is not a concentrated animal feeding operation and the
appropriate application of manure are activities within the scope of
the anti-nuisance protection afforded by the Act..260
A Minnesota animal nuisance case displays a factual situation
261
In
where ULPA would not support an anti-nuisance defense.
Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., neighbors claimed that a hog
262
confinement facility created a nuisance. The facility had an outdoor
concrete manure lagoon and the contents of the lagoon were pumped
and spread on fields each autumn.263 By presenting evidence that the
defendant intentionally maintained a condition that was offensive to
264
the senses, the plaintiffs established an actionable claim in nuisance.
The protection of natural resources under ULPA is not intended to
interfere with nuisance actions for facilities with concentrated animal
production, lagoons, or spray fields.265
ULPA is also not intended to preclude nuisance actions
266
involving the clear-cutting of timber or the development of roads.
With respect to the provision for the clear-cutting of timber, the
Supreme Court of Washington has held that this practice was not
protected under Washington anti-nuisance provisions.267 However,
the court’s decision was based upon the coming to the nuisance
doctrine and the fact that the defendant had never logged the
property.268 To clarify that the anti-nuisance protection does not

259. Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2.
260. See id. tits. III(B), V(B) (clarifying the coverage of these activities).
261. Wendinger v. Forst Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
262. Id. at 549. The plaintiffs also alleged a trespass but the court found that the odors
complained of did not interfere with their “exclusive possession” of land but rather with their
“use and enjoyment.” Id. at 550.
263. Id. at 549. This facility became operational in 1995, replacing livestock production that
had involved animal waste mixed with straw that was hauled away in solid form. Id.
264. Id. at 551-552 (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a nuisance claim had to be
supported by evidence of “wrongful conduct”).
265. Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2. But see Charter Twp. of Shelby v. Papesh, 704 N.W.2d
92, 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s summary judgment on a nuisance claim
against a poultry operation due to the possibility that the right-to-farm law provided a defense);
Horne v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that allegations concerning
a poultry operation interfering with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their property was defeated
by the Pennsylvania right-to-farm law).
266. Tit. IV(B)(4), infra app. 2.
267. Alpental Cmty. Club, Inc. v. Seattle Gymnastics Soc’y, 111 P.3d 257, 262 (Wash. 2005)
(declining to find that the clear-cutting of a slope was shielded by an anti-nuisance statute).
268. Id.
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apply to clear-cutting, an exception denying its coverage is
warranted.269
Another exception from the anti-nuisance protection includes
activities involving sewage sludge.270 The aboveground application or
storage of sewage sludge for the production of crops or forest
271
products is not accorded anti-nuisance protection under ULPA.
Due to the potential that these activities might involve significant
adverse consequences for neighboring landowners, they are more
appropriately handled by existing nuisance law and other
regulations.272
A state may desire that the anti-nuisance protection of ULPA
not apply in some areas where there is no justification for changing
nuisance law.273 Any activity on lands within an incorporated city
might remain subject to nuisance lawsuits.274 This provision would be
tailored by each state for governmental subdivisions in which lands
275
Presumably, a
should not be granted anti-nuisance protection.
legislature would not want the protection to apply in an area where
concentrations of human activities mean there is little justification for
protecting nuisances and where nuisances on governmental

269. Tit. IV(B)(4), infra app. 2 (stating that the “clear cutting of timber and development of
roads” remains subject to nuisance law). This is due to the fact that clear-cutting is not
considered to be an appropriate activity due to accompanying ecological harm. See Stuart L.
Pimm et al., Can We Defy Nature’s End?, 293 SCIENCE 2207, 2207 (2001) (observing that clearcutting can adversely affect biodiveristy); Charles R. Scott, Note, Liquidation Timber
Harvesting in Maine: Potential Policy Approaches, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 256-57 (2005)
(observing that clear-cutting has detrimental consequences on soils and the ecology).
270. Tit IV(B)(5), infra app. 2.
271. Id. (adopting a provision from the Virginia right-to-farm law, VA. CODE ANN. § 3.122.28 (1994), regarding the application of sewage sludge to allow local governments to regulate
this activity).
272. See Blanton v. Amelia County, 540 S.E.2d 869, 875 (Va. 2001) (finding that a state
statute regulating the application of sewage sludge preempted the challenged county
ordinances). Cf., Hydropress Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mount Bethel, 836 A.2d 912,
920 (Pa. 2003) (finding that regulation of the land application of sewage sludge by a county
ordinance was not preempted by the state’s Solid Waste Management Act but the local
government exceeded its police power in enacting its ordinance regulating sludge).
273. See tit. IV(C), infra app. 2. Some states limit anti-nuisance protection to lands within
agricultural districts. See N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 308(3) (McKinney 2004).
274. Id. (adopting a provision from the South Dakota right to farm law, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-10-25.5 (2004), whereby the right-to-farm law does not apply “within the limits of
any incorporated municipality”).
275. Id. States have varied individualized rules concerning local governmental units. A
legislature may decide that anti-nuisance protection is not appropriate for a category of local
unit. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.295(4) (West 2000) (declining to provide anti-nuisance
protection to activities in cities, towns, and villages).
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properties, such as parks, are already accorded other forms of
protection.276
E. Retained Rights
In absence of further clarification, ULPA might be interpreted
expansively to provide anti-nuisance protection against a few claims
277
that should be retained. Alternatively, ULPA might be interpreted
to interfere with manure application practices that should continue to
278
be viable. Title V of the Act specifically addresses four categories
of rights to acknowledge their intended resolution under the Act.279
1. Unaffected Claims
Title V(A) identifies three groups of claims that are not affected
by the Act.280 The first group involves damages for activities in
violation of any federal, state, or local statute or governmental
regulation, permit, or court order.281 ULPA does not impact liability
for violations of existing legal provisions. The second category of
claims involves damages for pollution, discharges, overflows, and
trespasses.282 ULPA is not intended to eliminate liability for activities

276. Id. Protection may occur under governmental or sovereign immunity provisions. See
Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private
Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 289-303 (2002) (examining situations
where states may waive their sovereign immunity); Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of
Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485, 489 (2001) (arguing that sovereign immunity in the
United States developed independently from English law); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming
Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 137589 (2001) (offering ideas for Congress to subject states to damages liability for violations of
intellectual property rights); Jonathan R. Siegel, Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity and the
Ideology of the Eleventh Amendment, 52 DUKE L.J. 1167, 1243 (2003) (examining our
“nonsensical scheme” of waivers of sovereign immunity that has “left the federal judicial system
helpless to prevent manifest injustice and waste of judicial resources.”).
277. For example. flooding and violations of existing legal provisions.
278. Such as the agronomic application of manure.
279. Tit. V, infra app. 2.
280. Id. tit. V(A).
281. Id. tit. V(A)(1). While it may be obvious that an anti-nuisance law simply addresses
nuisance causes of action, a more definitive statement will prevent defenses such as that
asserted in State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1999), whereby the defendant
hog-producer sought to violate waste control requirements via the state’s right to farm statute.
See infra notes 285-296 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
282. Tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2 (incorporating provisions from the Illinois Right-To-Farm
statute, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2002) that precludes nuisance protection for
polluting and overflow events causing damages).
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that that led to physical damages of another’s property.283 If an
activity constitutes a violation, leads to pollution, or involves a
trespass, the adversely affected party may advance a claim for
resulting damages.284
A case from Iowa illustrates why it is helpful to state explicitly
that citizens remain liable for damages from a violation of an existing
285
In State ex. rel. Miller v.
regulatory or statutory requirement.
DeCoster, the Iowa Attorney General sued a hog producer for
violations involving improper spray irrigation of hog waste and
inadequacies in an earthen waste storage basin.286 DeCoster refused
to take responsibility for his actions, claiming that the state’s
enforcement action of its water pollution and animal waste control
requirements was unwarranted by the facts.287 Regarding the spray
irrigation, DeCoster argued that his introduction of pollutants to
288
In
navigable waters was indirect, so there could be no liability.
rejecting this argument, the court noted that a loophole for indirect
289
actions would not provide meaningful protection against pollution.
For charges concerning violations of a storage basin regulation,
DeCoster claimed that the violation was not foreseeable due to his
283. Id. See also Simon v. Neises, 395 P.2d 308, 312 (Kan. 1964) (observing that the
maintenance of a levee causing increased volume of surface water to damage an adjacent
property constituted a continuing nuisance); Meyers v. Kissner, 594 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ill. 1992)
(finding that property owners could incur liability under the law for continuing nuisances for
constructing earthen levees that obstructed the natural flow of water, causing injury to plaintiff’s
farmland).
284. Tit. V(A)(1)-(2), infra app. 2 (drawing upon the language of a number of right-to-farm
laws including 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4 (West 2002), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072(6)
(West 2005), 3 PA. STAT. ANN. § 955 (West 1995), and VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.29(C) (1994)).
285. State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 596 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1999). See also State ex. rel.
Miller v. DeCoster, 608 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 2000) (contesting the imposition of “a strict
liability standard for the discharge of waste into the state’s watercourses.”); Gill v. LDI, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 1188, 1200 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (finding the right-to-farm affirmative defense was not
applicable since defendants had violated several water quality laws). But see Horne v. Haladay,
728 A.2d 954, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that an allegation that the defendant was
violating a statute or regulation was not proven).
286. 596 N.W.2d at 900-01. Evidence showed that tile drains from the spray application field
were discharging a dark putrid liquid into a stream running into the Iowa River. Id. 901-02.
The violation involving the earthen storage basin involved waste overtopping the berm. Id. at
903.
287. Id. at 902-03.
288. Id. at 902-03 (arguing that the liquid waste was sprayed on fields and only entered a
river after passing through a tile under the field indirectly). The defendant claimed that
culpability under the Iowa law required direct pollution. Id. (citing IOWA CODE § 455B.186(1)
(1995)).
289. Id. at 902 (noting the absurdity of such an interpretation as it would render pollution
statutes meaningless).
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lack of specific information.290 The court noted that the issue was
actually whether the trier of fact believed DeCoster’s testimony that
he did not know about the problem, as opposed to contrary evidence
produced by another witness.291 Evidence to knowledge supported
the finding of the district court; thus the ruling that DeCoster had
292
violated water pollution provisions was upheld.
A year later, this same defendant again sought relief from the
Supreme Court of Iowa from a judgment concerning a strict liability
293
standard for violating a state statute. Again, the court declined to
interpret the pollution statute as urged by DeCoster.294 The tenacity
of this defendant in attempting to escape liability for pollution shows
a need for an unequivocal provision in ULPA that people remain
liable for damages regarding violations of law.295 Furthermore, the
definitive statement concerning violations, discharges, overflows, and
trespasses make it obvious that strict liability standards incorporated
in pollution statutes remain as causes of action.296
For discharges, overflows, and trespasses, the Georgia case of
Lincoln v. Tyler concerning damages for excessive stormwater and
sediment discharges evinces why such actions should not receive
protection against nuisance lawsuits.297 Developers had constructed a
subdivision that caused discharges onto plaintiffs’ property causing
298
damages. Although, there was evidence of a “minimal amount of
sediment deposits from the subdivision onto plaintiffs’ property” and
“inadequately maintained” sediment control structures, the trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant.299 In reversing the trial

290. Id. at 903 (claiming that his employee was not warned of the freeboard level at the
earthen basin, so his conduct was not a substantial factor in producing the violation).
291. Id. (acknowledging that plaintiff’s argument would be true if he had established his
version of the facts).
292. Id. at 903.
293. State ex. rel. Miller v. DeCoster, 608 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 2000) (concerning a
violation of IOWA CODE § 455B.191 (1997)).
294. Id. (affirming the judgment for the state).
295. Tit. V(A)(1)-(2), infra app. 2.
296. Id. See State ex. rel. Miller, 596 N.W.2d at 902 (finding strict liability under IOWA
CODE § 455B.186(1) (1995) for the discharge of a pollutant into state waters“”).
297. Lincoln v. Tyler, 574 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming damages from
sediment discharge based upon trespass and nuisance claims).
298. Tyler v. Lincoln, 527 S.E.2d 180, 181 (Ga. 2000) (considering an appeal concerning
summary judgment denying punitive damages in favor of defendant).
299. Tyler v. Lincoln, 513 S.E.2d 6, 7-8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 527
S.E.2d 180 (Ga. 2000). The ruling of this court supports the contention that plaintiffs often have
difficulties in maintaining causes of action for discharges. The case reveals the need for a
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court’s ruling, the appellate court noted that the measure “of personal
damages recoverable in a nuisance case is the enlightened conscience
300
At the subsequent trial, the jury found for the
of the jury.”
plaintiffs on their trespass and nuisance claims.301 The provision on
pollution, discharges, overflows, and trespasses in ULPA would
assure that people remain liable for actionable damages and
trespasses.302 The act does not sanction activities that physically
invade or alter neighboring properties.303
A third category of unaffected claims involves tort actions in
which the attractive nuisance doctrine applies.304 Title V(A)(3)
305
clearly states that the act does not apply to this doctrine. While this
definitive statement in ULPA whereby actions for discharges do not qualify for the antinuisance protection. Tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2.
300. Tyler, 513 S.E.2d at 9 (citing Arvida/JMB Partners v. Hadaway, 489 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997) and denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the nuisance, trespass,
and negligence causes of action).
301. Lincoln v. Tyler, 574 S.E.2d 440, 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (awarding $43,000 in special
damages and $90,000 in attorney fees and expenses of litigation).
302. Infra app. 2, tit. V(A)(2). The California right-to-farm law provides a contrary
resolution. See Rancho Viejo v. Tres Amigos Viejos, LLC, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 494 (Ct. App.
2002). In watering crops, runoff irrigation water flowed onto the plaintiff’s property causing
damage. Id. In responding to a suit for damages, the court interpreted the California right-tofarm law as covering “traditional farming operations.” Id. at 491. While the law covered
nuisances, the court found an intent to cover “ongoing, standard agricultural activities”
regardless of the labeling of the conduct as a nuisance or trespass. Id. at 488. Since California
law defines nuisances to include activities that intrude upon and cause physical damage to
property, the anti-nuisance defense was available to defeat the claim regarding the runoff water.
Id. at 489, 494. See also Souza v. Lauppe, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 1997) (granting
summary judgment to defendants as the cause of action for water intrusion was precluded by
the right-to-farm law).
303. Tit. V(A)(2), infra app. 2. Another case involving an action for flooding illustrates the
importance of this provision. Benton City v. Adrian, 748 P.2d 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988). In
Benton City, farmers discharged excess irrigation water fouling a well serving a private
residence, eroding an area to expose a City sanitary water line, and depositing sand and silt in
an irrigation canal. Id. at 680-81. The City and owner of the irrigation canal sued for injunctive
relief and damages. Id. at 681. On appeal, the Benton City court noted that the Washington
right-to-farm law did not prevent the lawsuit for a trespass. Id. at 681-682. Under ULPA,
damages for flooding would be allowed; adversely affected individuals will have protection
against damages from discharges, flooding, and trespasses. Tit. V(B)(2), infra app. 2. This
would include actions for damages for the construction of physical features that cause flooding.
See, e.g., Grundy v. Thurston County, 117 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Wash. 2005) (allowing a nuisance
cause of action for the construction of a sea wall that caused a property to be vulnerable to
flooding).
304. Tit. V(A)(3), infra app. 2. An attractive nuisance doctrine may apply to children to
protect them from hidden, attractive dangers.
305. Id. (adopting the idea from a dispute in Washington State involving natural bodies of
water, Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, 914 P.2d 728, 733 (Wash. 1995)). See also Fritts v.
Clover Park Sch. Dist. No. 400, No. 30323-0-II, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2895, at *5-9 (Wash.
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may be obvious to most in the legal community, the inclusion of this
provision should assure the public that ULPA does not affect the
306
continued viability of this doctrine.
2. Further Clarification for Manure Application
Title V(B) enumerates additional provisions for manure
application to define rights that are not affected by ULPA.307 The act
endorses the practice of applying manure to lands as a source of
nutrients for plant growth because it is an agronomic practice that
should be encouraged as part of sustainable production.308 This is in
contrast to the over application of manure as a waste byproduct and
concentrations of animals that may severely denigrate local
environmental conditions.309
Differentiating between acceptable manure application and
unacceptable lagoons and spray fields is challenging. ULPA retains
nuisance rights against bothersome business activities involving
lagoons and spray fields while exempting farming activities involving
fertilization with manure.310 The distinction is that lagoons and spray
fields involve business decisions to employ specialized technologies to
handle wastes that are accompanied by a propensity for adversely
affecting neighboring property owners, whereas manure application
to fields is an agronomic practice consistent with the economy of
nature.311
However, qualifications are needed to preclude
Ct. App. 2003) (showing how the attractive nuisance doctrine works with a discussion of the
elements needed for a young child to qualify).
306. Tit. V(A)(3), infra app. 2. ULPA does not address distinctions for minors so does not
affect the attractive nuisance doctrine; ULPA simply clarifies that the attractive nuisance
doctrine remains in force. Id.
307. Id. tit. V(B).
308. Id. See Araji ET AL., supra note 202, at 179-80 (citing studies showing manure to
constitute “a valuable bio-resource that should be utilized.”); Terence J. Centner, Developing
Institutions to Encourage the Use of Animal Wastes as Production Inputs, 21 AGRIC. & HUMAN
VALUES 367, 372 (2004) (advancing regulations that mandate selected production requirements
or practices to remedy pollution problems).
309. See Tit. IV(B)(2)-(3), infra app. 2 (providing that concentrated animal feeding
operations, lagoons, and spray fields do not receive protection against nuisance lawsuits).
310. Id. tits. IV(B)(3), V(B).
311. Id. See also Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding ongoing violations of the Clean Water Act by dairies
discharging pollutants into navigable waters); United States v. New Portland Meadows, Inc.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19153, at *5-6 (D. Ore. July 30, 2002) (alleging a discharge of animal
waste in violation of a condition in a state permit); Water Keeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield
Foods, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21314, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (alleging violations of
the Clean Water Act by North Carolina hog producers); Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F.
Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (D. Idaho 2001) (alleging water contamination from a wastewater holding
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unacceptable manure-application practices.312 Therefore, provisions
from the federal regulations governing best management practices for
the application of manure from concentrated animal feeding
operations are incorporated into ULPA’s title V(B).313
Manure application needs to be conducted pursuant to generally
314
For
acceptable practices, including agronomic rate requirements.
applications to meet the agronomic rate requirement, the producer
must develop and implement a nutrient management plan that
incorporates application rates for manure that “minimize phosphorus
and nitrogen transport from the field to surface waters in compliance
with the technical standards for nutrient management.”315 Such
technical standards include “a field-specific assessment of the
potential for nitrogen and phosphorus transport from the field” to
surface waters, address the application of nutrients on each field to
achieve realistic production goals, and minimize nitrogen and
phosphorus movement to surface waters.316 These requirements
should allow an agronomic practice consistent with the economy of
nature while minimizing adverse impacts on neighbors.

pond); Community Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 65 F. Supp. 2d
1129, 1132-33 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (alleging the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by
defendant dairies); Neuse River Found. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48, 50-51 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (alleging pollution and contamination of navigable waters by North Carolina hog
producers). ’ See also Araji, ET. AL., supra note 202, at 190 (observing that animal manure is a
biological resource with ecological benefits).
312. Tit. V(B)(1)-(2), infra app. 2. See supra notes 255-265 (addressing concentrated animal
feeding operations).
313. Id. (incorporating text from 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 412 (2005) to prescribe best
management practices for point-source concentrated animal feeding operations that apply
manure to fields).
314. Id. tit. V(B)(1). The issue of overapplication was noted in the Environmental
Protection Agency’s comments accompanying the publication of new regulations for
concentrated animal feeding operations. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations (CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7186 (Feb. 12, 2003) (preamble).
315. Tit. V(B)(1), infra app. 2 (adopting prescriptions on best management requirements for
concentrated animal feeding operations from the federal regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(2)
(2005)).
316. Id. tit. V(B)(2) (adopting provisions from federal regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 412.4(c)(1)
(2005)).
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F. Local Governments
Laws, ordinances, and regulations adopted by local governments
(hereafter called local regulations) may contribute to the demise of
land resources by interfering with agricultural and forestry
317
318
As a minority of the voting public, property owners
practices.
seeking to preserve their farms and forestry operations may not be
able to stop local regulations from interfering with their production
and management practices.319
To preclude local interferences,
ULPA’s title VI sets forth provisions that preempt certain local
regulations.320
The need for a preemption provision may be gleaned from two
cases in which local regulations interfered with production activities.
In the first case, the appellate court found that a local government

317. See Overgaard v. Rock County Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 02-601, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13001, at *4-5 (D. Minn. July 25, 2003) (considering a local ordinance regulating animal
feedlots); Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995)
(considering a zoning ordinance that established a buffer where timber could not be harvested);
Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 3105, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4,
2003) (requiring a local permit to raise game birds); Villari v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust. of
Deptford, 649 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1994) (considering a zoning ordinance that established
acreage requirements for raising pigs); French v. Mt. Jackson, No. 2606, 1985 Va. Cir. LEXIS
109, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 2, 1985) (considering a provision of a town code that regulated
weeds, grass, and foreign growth on property).
318. The farm population is estimated to comprise of less than three percent of the U.S.
population. EMERY N. CASTLE, AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE AMERICAN
COUNTRYSIDE 12 (1998).
319. E.g., Pasco County v. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc., 573 So.2d 909 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(involving the issue of whether a poultry producer could engage in a “wet manure distribution
process”).
320. Tit. VI, infra app. 2 (adopting the idea from the Michigan right-to-farm law, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6) (West 2003 & Supp. 2006), that local governments should not
enact any ordinance, regulation, or resolution that conflicts with the accepted agricultural and
management practices developed under the state statute). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
35-3.5-102(5) (West 2005) (precluding ordinances and resolutions in certain cases); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 823.14(6) (West 2006) (precluding local ordinances that “prohibit, restrict, regulate, or
otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as agricultural land”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4504 (2001) (limiting powers of local governments regarding zoning
and ordinances that may interfere with agricultural practices); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
251.005 (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006) (establishing limitations on the regulation of existing
agricultural operations for some local governments); H.B. 1646, § 1, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2005)
(prohibiting local governments from adopting unauthorized local ordinances) (available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us) (in the “by Bill” window scroll to “2005-2006 Regular Session” and
search “HB 1646” in the adjacent search bar); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-22.28 (1994) (precluding
county ordinances that require “a special exception or special use permit be obtained for any
production agriculture or silviculture activity in an area that is zoned as an agricultural
district”).
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could interfere with a forestry practice.321 In the second case, the
Michigan right-to-farm law operated to preclude a local ordinance
322
that sought to control a nuisance activity. To effect the purposes set
forth in ULPA’s title I, local governments must be precluded from
interfering with production and management activities conducted
323
according to generally accepted practices.
In Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, a California
county adopted provisions in its zoning ordinance to address conflicts
324
The ordinance prohibited
accompanying timber harvesting.
“commercial timber harvesting in designated rural areas of the
325
County ‘within 1,000 feet of any legal dwelling. . . .’” A lumber
company challenged the buffer requirement established by the
ordinance claiming it was preempted by the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest
Practice Act of 1973.326 The court found that the state statute
preempted local regulation of timber harvesting but not regulations
defining where timber may be harvested.327 In upholding the county’s
buffer requirement, the court affirmed the ability of a county to enact
regulations for parcels not designated in timber production zones and
to preclude harvesting on these parcels.328 Thus, in California, local
governments can interfere with timber production. Under ULPA,
local governments retain their powers to zone but may not interfere

321. Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of San Mateo, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 162 (Ct. App.
1995).
322. Milan Twp. v. Jaworski, No. 240444, 2003 Mich. LEXIS 3105, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App.
Dec. 4, 2003).
323. Tits. I, III(A), VI(A)-(B), infra app. 2 (delineating the legislative purpose, defining
activities, and establishing the preemption of some local regulations).
324. 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 159, 162 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing complaints about noise and potential
wildfire and erosion, and noting concerns about scenic and aesthetic qualities).
325. Id. at 161-62 (observing that the county had decided that neither the state statute nor
the “regulations adopted thereunder establish[ed] a buffer zone between residential uses and
timber harvesting.”).
326. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 4511–4628 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). The court noted that
“the Legislature had established a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the conduct of
timber operations.” Big Creek Lumber, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
327. Id. at 162-63 (observing the regulatory preemption of local regulations concerning the
conduct of timber operations but not where the operations might take place). Under the
California Timberland Productivity Act of 1982, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51100–51155 (West 1983
& Supp. 2005), local governments must zone described timberlands as “timberland production
zones.” 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-63. See also CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 51104(g), 51112–51113.
However, for parcels outside of these zones, local controls are possible. Id. § 51112(d).
328. Big Creek Lumber, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (distinguishing timber production zones
from other areas that contain timber and finding that local governments retain zoning authority
for these other areas).
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with production and management activities conducted according to
generally accepted practices.329
A local government’s interference with a defendant raising
pheasants and quail at a hunting preserve was considered by a
Michigan appellate court in Milan Township v. Jaworski.330 The
defendant defied a local ordinance and continued to raise game birds,
leading the township to seek injunctive relief for a “nuisance per
331
se.”
A trial court agreed, and the defendant was enjoined from
“selling the right to hunt game birds on its property.”332 On appeal,
the defendant alleged error in the court’s finding that the ordinance
333
The
was not preempted by the Michigan Right to Farm Act.
334
appellate court found the preserve qualified as a farm operation and
there was a direct conflict between the local ordinance and the state
335
The local ordinance was preventing the defendant from
law.
running a farm operation protected by the state right-to-farm law.336
Due to the state preemption provision, the contrary local ordinance
337
was not applied. Similar to the Michigan right-to-farm law, ULPA
would preclude a local ordinance from interfering with the operation
of a hunting preserve.338
The preemption of local ordinances by state laws has become a
significant issue.339 In the absence of preemption, local governments
329. Tit. VI(A), infra app. 2.
330. No. 240444, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 3105, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2003). The
hunting preserve, owned by a limited liability company, was licensed by the state Department of
Natural Resources. Id. at *1-3. The enforcement action ensued after the local government
rejected the defendant’s application for a special use permit and the defendant continued its
operations. Id. at *2. However, the local government contended a special permit was required
because the defendant was charging a fee that rendered the preserve a “commercial recreational
area.” Id. at *3.
331. Id.
332. Id. (finding no preemption by the state right-to-farm law).
333. Id. at *16 (considering the preemption offered by MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
286.474(6)).
334. Id. at *10-12 (analyzing the Michigan right-to-farm law’s definitions for farm and farm
operation, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.472(a)-(b) (West 2003)).
335. Id. at *16-17.
336. Id. at *16-17 (disagreeing with the government that defendant’s game preserve was a
recreational area because it qualified under the right-to-farm law as a farm operation).
337. Id.
338. Tit. VI(A)-(B), infra app. 2.
339. See Alexandra Manchik Barnhill, Note, Entrenching the Status Quo: The Ninth Circuit
Uses Preemption Doctrines to Interpret CERCLA as Setting a Ceiling for Local Regulation of
Environmental Problems, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 487, 513-28 (2004) (addressing the preemption of
local authority concerning hazardous waste cleanup); Jeffrey A. Berger, Comment, Phoenix
Grounded: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Changing Preemption Doctrine on State and
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may take actions that undermine state policy.340 ULPA follows the
Michigan right-to-farm law to preclude local governments from
interfering with production and management activities conducted
according to generally accepted practices.341
Production and
management activities include those conditions and pursuits that are
342
This should assist landowners of
defined as activities by the act.
undeveloped lands in continuing activities associated with the use of
their lands.
At the same time, local governments are not completely
precluded from regulating significant local problems.343 Title VI(C)
allows local governments to prescribe standards regarding the

Local Impediments to Airport Expansion, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 941, 991-92 (2003) (advocating a
liberal preemption stance to limit local and state interference with airport expansion); Emily
Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally: Dormant Federal Common Law Preemption of State and
Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 923, 979-92 (2003) (advocating
a doctrinal test for dormant federal common law preemption of actions affecting foreign
affairs); Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regulation: The Constitutional Tension Between
Police Power, Preemption & Takings, 11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2002) (analyzing
federal preemption over airports and how it interacts with local controls concerning noise);
Emily V. Griffen, Comment, “Relations Stop Nowhere”: ERISA Preemption of San Francisco’s
Domestic Partner Ordinance, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 482-83 (2001) (evaluating how the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts local ordinances requiring benefits for
domestic partners to be the same as for married co-workers); Robert Stumberg, Preemption &
Human Rights: Local Options after Crosby v. NFTC, 32 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 109, 119-27
(2000) (considering the preemption of state laws that attempt to boycott goods from foreign
countries with human rights violations); Valerie Watnick, Federal Preemption of Tort Claims
Under FIFRA: The Erosion of a Defense, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 419, 430-54 (2003)
(discussing the judicial elimination of preemption under the Federal Fungicide, Insecticide, and
Rodenticide Act for certain tort claims); Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and State
Preemption of Environmental Law, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 285 (2000) (evaluating
preemption in general on local efforts to protect the environment to advocate allowing different
“levels of government to take the lead in formulating and implementing environmental law”).
See also Blanton v. Amelia County, 540 S.E.2d 869, 875 (Va. 2001) (finding a county’s
ordinances to be void and unenforceable due to conflict with state law).
340. See, e.g., J-II Invs. Inc. v. Leon County, 908 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding that the right-to-farm law prevented local governments from adopting ordinances
relating to agriculture but did not preclude enforcing ordinances in place); In re Proesch, 44 P.3d
1173, 1179 (Idaho 2002) (observing that the Idaho right-to-farm law precludes the adoption of
ordinances or resolutions declaring activities conducted in accordance with generally recognized
agricultural practices to be a nuisance); Belvidere Twp. v. Heinze, 615 N.W.2d 250, 254-55
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the Michigan right-to-farm law, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
286.474(6), preempts township zoning restrictions on agricultural practices).
341. Tit. VI(A), infra app. 2 (preempting local ordinances, regulations, or resolutions that
limit production and management activities on undeveloped lands so long as they are conducted
according to generally acceptable practices). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 286.474(6)
(West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
342. Id. tit. III(A). See also Centner, supra Part C.1. (defining activities covered by ULPA).
343. Tits. IV(A), VI(C), infra app. 2.
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keeping of a diseased plant or animal which is injurious to human
welfare or health.344 Local governments are also free to regulate
waste materials creating an injurious condition to public health as
345
delineated by title VI(A)(4).
G. Litigation Expenses
Title VII enumerates provisions whereby the costs of litigation
can be shifted to persons initiating unsuccessful lawsuits.346 This idea
347
Due to the
is adopted from several different right-to-farm laws.
costs of litigation, an ungrounded lawsuit against a property owner
may lead to the demise of a land resource.348 A defendant may be so

344. Id.tit. VI(C). This provision is slightly different from the exceptions to the antinuisance protection provided by title IV(A)(3). Id. app. 2. Title IV allows nuisance lawsuits
concerning diseased plants and animals and for harboring pests. Id. Local governments may
continue to regulate local diseased plants and animals, but are precluded from regulating pests.
Id. tit. VI(C). Justification for this differentiation may be gleaned from examining the local
ordinance considered in Kupke v. Orange County, 838 So.2d 598, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
The county cited a farmer for violating a local ordinance, with evidence suggesting that there
was concern that rats and snakes were creating a nuisance. Kupke, 838 So.2d at 599. For
agricultural and forestry producers, most pests should not be a problem as producers will
control pest infestations to enhance production and profits. Moreover, pests that cause diseases
can be regulated. Therefore, there is no overriding justification for allowing local ordinances
controlling pests on undeveloped lands. However, states continue to have authority to regulate
pests. Tit. IV(A)(3), infra app. 2.
345. Id. tit. IV(A)(4).
346. Id. tit. VII. This alters liability law by adopting a “plaintiff pays” policy for
unsuccessful plaintiffs. Concern over frivolous lawsuits has led legislatures to craft unbalanced
fee-shifting provisions weighted toward the interests of particular categories of plaintiffs. See
Markita D. Cooper, Job Reference Immunity Statutes: Prevalent But Irrelevant, 11 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 37-38 (2001) (discussing a fee-shifting statute for challenges concerning
employment references); Edward F. Sherman, From ‘Loser Pays’ to Modified Offer of Judgment
Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 1870 (1998)
(analyzing the premise that “loser pays” rules encourage settlements).
347. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102(3) (West 2005); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
70/4.5 (West 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-10-25.6 (2004); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §
251.004(b) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08(3)(c)(2) (West 1994 & Supp.
2005). A Wisconsin case involving a suit against a defendant for nuisance involving the use of
fertilizer in a cranberry bog also shows why ULPA incorporates provisions on litigation
expenses. LeVake v. Zawistowski, No. 02-C-0657-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4916, at *5-10 (W.
D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2004). Lakefront property owners sued the cranberry farmer for causing algae
growth in the waters adjacent to their properties. Id. at *2. The court found insufficient
evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ claims, and dismissed the case. Id. at *3-5. The defendant
sought attorney fees and costs under the state right-to-farm law. Id. at *5 (citing WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 823.08). The lack of jurisdiction precluded an award under the right-to-farm law, but
the court was able to award costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1919 (2000) due to the lack of justification in
bringing the suit. LeVake, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4916, at *7-10.
348. Fee-shifting generally might be adopted for situations where individuals bring
unmeritorious suits to extract settlements. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence
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overwhelmed by a lawsuit, or may incur so many expenses, that
defending the claim is not a reasonable response.349 Thus, an
aggressive plaintiff might cause undeveloped lands to be taken out of
350
use without winning a lawsuit.
To counter the possibility of a plaintiff advancing an unjustified
lawsuit, ULPA provides that a prevailing defendant will recover the
aggregate amount of litigation expenses determined by the court to
have been reasonably incurred in the defense of the nuisance action,
351
Litigation
together with a reasonable amount for attorney fees.
expenses are to include court costs and litigation costs.352 Moreover,
no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff is required for the recovery of
353
expenses and fees.
However, ULPA title VII offers a limitation to circumscribe
liability for expenses and fees through a more descriptive definition of
354
A prevailing defendant is defined as a
a prevailing defendant.
defendant in whose favor a final court order or judgment is
355
Therefore, a prevailing defendant does not include a
rendered.
defendant who entered into a negotiated settlement agreement.356
Moreover, a defendant who takes corrective or other action to reduce
an aggravating situation prior to a final court order or judgment
would not qualify as a prevailing defendant.357
Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 588
(1997) (observing that fee-shifting might be desirable if it discouraged suits that were unlikely to
succeed, but not finding strong support that fee-shifting reduces the number of lawsuits).
349. See Paster, supra note 106, at 300 (concluding that a nuisance lawsuit can adversely
affect agricultural operations).
350. See id.; See also Tom Daniels, WHEN CITY AND COUNTRY COLLIDE: MANAGING
GROWTH IN THE METROPOLITAN FRINGE 220 (Island Press, 1999) (identifying increased
liability insurance fees as an expense facing owners of lands near development).
351. Tit. VII(A), infra app. 2 (adopting the recovery provisions from the Illinois and
Wisconsin right-to-farm laws, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.5 (West 2002), WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 823.08(3)(c)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2005)).
352. Id. tit. VII(C). This may differ from how a state views such costs. See Vicencio v.
Lincoln-Way Builders, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ill. 2003) (differentiating court costs from
litigation costs).
353. Tit. VII, infra app. 2. Other statutes providing remuneration for prevailing defendants
may contain a requirement that payment is only due if the plaintiff acted in bad faith. See
Boeckenhauer v. Joe Rizza Lincoln Mercury, No. 2-04-1213, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 1043, at *814 (Ill. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2005) (considering the issue of whether bad faith was required to award
attorneys fees under a consumer fraud statute).
354. Tit. VII(B), infra app. 2.
355. Id. (incorporating a requirement for a prevailing defendant from the Illinois right-tofarm law, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/4.5 (West 2002)).
356. Id.
357. Id.
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A further definition of litigation expenses is also set forth to
guide parties and judges.358 Litigation expenses mean the sum of the
costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney,
expert witness and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or
participate in an action in which an activity is alleged to be a
359
nuisance.
CONCLUSION
Anti-nuisance provisions have been a prominent feature of
nuisance law for more than twenty years. While the right-to-farm
laws have generally provided appropriate resolutions for competing
property interests regarding family farms, agriculture and society
have markedly changed. Massive consolidation of agricultural
production has created concentrations of animals and supporting
input and processing facilities. These agricultural enterprises are
quite different from the family farms that were considered as a
justification for the right-to-farm legislation.360 Right-to-farm laws
offering protection to such facilities may not reflect the feelings of the
majority and may not constitute a good resolution for competing
interests.361
Changed circumstances and judicial rulings on constitutional
proscriptions mean that the future of some right-to-farm laws may be
362
By protecting commercial facilities that generate major
in doubt.
negative externalities, the laws may no longer offer an appropriate
363
resolution for conflicting interests. Simultaneously, there is a need
to offer greater protection for undeveloped lands and natural
resources.364 ULPA incorporates an anti-nuisance paradigm based
upon an economy of nature to provide new protection for farmland,
365
forests, and natural areas without impacting right-to-farm laws.
With the adoption of ULPA, a state’s right-to-farm law may change
or be repealed without affecting the anti-nuisance protection

358. See id. tit. VII(C).
359. Id. (incorporating a description of expenses from WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08(3)(c)(2)
(West 1994 & Supp. 2005)).
360. See Walker, supra note 15, at 489 (commenting on the significance of family farms and
encroaching suburbanization with respect to the adoption of the Michigan right-to-farm law).
361. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 5.
364. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
365. Tits. I, II, infra app. 2.
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accorded to the state’s land resources. Owners of undeveloped lands
will have greater protection against nuisance lawsuits for production
and management activities conducted according to generally accepted
practices.366

366. Id. tit. II.
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APPENDIX 1: STATE RIGHT TO FARM LAWS
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

State Codifications
ALA. CODE § 6-5-127 (LexisNexis 2005)
ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.235 (2004)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-111 to -112 (2005)
ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-4-107 (1996 & Supp. 2005)
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3482.5-.6 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2006)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-3.5-102 (West
2005)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-341 (West 2003
& Supp. 2006)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 1401 (2001)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.14 (West 2000 & Supp.
2006)
GA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-7 (1997 & Supp. 2006)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 165-1 to -6
(LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2005)
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4501 to -4504 (2001 &
Supp. 2006)
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 22-4801 to -4804 (2001 &
Supp. 2006)
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 22-4803A (Supp. 2006)
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 to /5 (West
2002)
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-6-9 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2006)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172D.1-.4 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2006)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 352.11 (West 2001 & Supp.
2006)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.11 (West 1998 & Supp.
2006)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-3201 to -3203 (2001)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1505 (2000)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.072 (West 2005)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3601-:3609 (2003)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2805 (2006)
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Maryland
Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

[Vol. 17:1

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006)
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 111, § 125A (West 2004
& Supp. 2006)
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 243, § 6 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2006)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.471-.474 (West
2003 & Supp. 2006)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.19 (West 200 & Supp.
2006)
MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-3-29 (2004)
MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.295 (West 2000 & Supp.
2006)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-30-101 to -105 (2005)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-4401 to -4404 (1997 &
Supp. 2005)
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.140(2) (2002)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 432:32-:35 (2002) &
Supp. 2006)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-1 to -10 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2006)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-9-1 to -7 (LexisNexis
1999 & Supp. 2003)
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 308, 308-a
(McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2006)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-701 (2000 & Supp. 2005)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 42-04-01 to -05 (1999 &
Supp. 2005)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 929.04 (West 1994 &
Supp. 2006)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.13 (West 2006)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 20-18 (West Supp.
2006)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1.1 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.930-.947 (2005)
3 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-954 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2006)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 2-23-1 to -7 (1998 & Supp.
2005)
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S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-45-10 to -70 (1987 &
Supp. 2005)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-10-25.1 to -25.6
(2004)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-26-102 to -103 (2000 &
Supp. 2005)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-18-101 to -104 (2000 &
Supp. 2005)
TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001-.006
(Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-38-7 to -8 (2002)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5751-5753 (2002 &
Supp. 2006)
VA. CODE §§ 3.1-22.28, .29 (1994)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300-.310 (West
1992 & Supp. 2005)
W. VA. CODE §§ 19-19-1 to -5 (2004)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 823.08 (West 1994 & Supp.
2005)
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-39-101 to -104 (2005)
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-44-101 to -103 (2005)
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APPENDIX 2: UNDEVELOPED LANDS PROTECTION ACT
I.

Legislative Purpose of the Act

A. It is the declared policy of this state to encourage the use of
lands for farmlands, forests, and natural areas while also conserving
and protecting these resources. Lands used for the production of
food, fiber, agricultural, horticultural, aquacultural, and forestry
products involve the productive use of the state’s resources. Equally
important are the state’s natural areas. Farmlands, forests, and
natural areas, hereafter referred to as “undeveloped lands,”
constitute unique and irreplaceable resources of statewide
importance, and the protection and preservation of these lands will
result in a general benefit to the health and welfare of people in the
state.
B. It is the further purpose of this act to protect undeveloped
lands used for cleansing air and water resources, scenic vistas, and
outdoor recreational activities for their continued use as ecological
and natural resources.
1. Open fields, pastures, forests, and natural areas are
important to tourism and the quality of life of people in the state.
2. The production of agricultural commodities and forestry
products are basic industries that are important to the health and
welfare of the people and to the economy. Sound agricultural and
silvicultural industries require the efficient and profitable use of water
and energy and many other natural, commercial, and industrial
resources.
3. A lack of adequate and informed consideration of
natural resources, their relationship to the state’s economy, and the
need to sustain activities on undeveloped lands has caused problems
for agricultural production in this state.
C. The legislature finds that urban encroachment and the
development and construction of structures on undeveloped lands
consisting of farmlands, forests, and natural areas often diminish the
long-term ability of the land and appurtenant lands to be maintained
in natural productive uses.
1. The sustained long-term use of undeveloped lands may
be achieved by avoiding development that leads to fragmentation of
parcels. Fragmentation begets interferences that may lead to the
further demise of undeveloped lands.
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2. Conflicts between urban land uses and activities on
undeveloped lands threaten the demise of important natural
resources. Subsequent nuisance lawsuits may encourage or force the
premature demise of the current productive capacities and
significantly interfere with the inherent agronomic qualities and
ecological values of these lands.
D. It is therefore the purpose of this act to limit the
circumstances under which farmlands, forests, and natural areas may
be deemed a nuisance.
II. The Protection
A. People who locate on or near areas used as farmlands,
forests, and natural areas must accept the conditions commonly
associated with living in the particular setting. It is the policy of this
state that farmlands, forests, and natural areas are protected;
therefore, necessary activities are allowed to continue. To qualify
under this act, an activity on undeveloped lands, as defined by the act,
must be conducted according to “generally accepted practices.”
B. No activity on undeveloped lands shall become a private or
public nuisance after two years from its established date of the
activity as a matter of law if the activity is conducted in conformity
with the provisions of all applicable federal, state, and local laws,
regulations, rules, ordinances, and permits and according to generally
accepted practices.
C. An activity on undeveloped lands is entitled to a rebuttable
presumption that it does not constitute a nuisance if the activity is
conducted in conformity with the provisions of all applicable federal,
state, and local laws, regulations, rules, ordinances, and permits and
according to generally accepted practices.
D. No activity on undeveloped lands shall be found a public or
private nuisance as a result of changed conditions in or around the
locality of the land or water resource if the activity has been in such
use for one year or more and if the activity was not a nuisance at the
time it began.
III. Definitions
A.

“Activities” refer to:
1. Conditions and pursuits associated with the production
of agricultural, aquacultural, and silvicultural products and the
management of production areas for continued agronomic objectives.
Activities include, but are not limited to, fertilizer application, weed
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and pest control, planting, cultivating, reforesting, on-site composting,
drainage, mowing, harvesting, land clearing, insect and disease
control, constructing ponds associated with a farming or aquacultural
operation, thinning, fire protection, and fence maintenance. An
activity may be accompanied by odors, noise, air particulates, use of
chemicals, and the lawful impairment of waters, except as otherwise
provided.
2. Conditions and pursuits associated with natural areas
including, but not limited to, those for the protection, management,
and development of scenic, outdoor recreational, cultural, historic,
archaeological, educational, and ecological resources.
B. “Farmlands” mean parcels greater than ten acres that are
devoted primarily to the production of crops, livestock, aquacultural,
horticultural, or other agricultural commodities, and include, but are
not limited to, lands used for field crops, vineyards, orchards, groves,
vegetable and fruit crops, pastures, areas without roofed structures
for holding farm animals, water bodies for the production of
aquacultural products, ponds, small lakes, forestry areas, and natural
areas appurtenant thereto.
C. “Forests” mean parcels greater than ten acres that are used
for the production of timber and related fiber crops. Forestry
production activities include timber harvest, site preparation, slash
disposal including controlled burning, tree planting, pre-commercial
thinning, fertilization, animal damage control, reasonable water
resource management, insect and disease control in forest land, and
any other generally accepted, reasonable, and prudent practice
normally employed in the management of a timber resource for
monetary profit.
D. “Generally accepted practices” mean reasonable and
prudent methods for the activities being conducted in a county or
contiguous county in which a nuisance claim is asserted.
1. Generally accepted practices will include, but not be
limited to, those practices necessary for the on-site production and
preparation of agricultural or forestry commodities, such as the
operation of equipment, proper use of pesticides, air and water
quality control, noise control, fertilizer application, labor practices,
and crop protection methods.
2. Practices that are commonly or reasonably associated
with agronomic production and activities in conformity with federal,
state, and local laws and regulations are presumed to be conducted
according to generally accepted practices.
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E. “Manure” is organic matter from farm animals used as
fertilizer in agriculture, and shall include poultry litter. Poultry litter
is excreted manure from avian species mixed with bedding material.
Manure contributes to the fertility of the soil by adding organic
matter and nutrients.
F. “Natural areas” mean parcels greater than ten acres which
have retained their natural, undeveloped character, although not
necessarily completely undisturbed, including lands which are
important in preserving archaeological or cultural resources,
ecosystems, flora, fauna, geological, open space, natural historical,
scenery, wildlife habitat, wetlands, or similar features of scientific or
educational value.
G. “Undeveloped lands” include farmlands, forests, and
natural areas in parcels that are greater than ten acres. These lands
may be used for farming, outdoor recreational activities, hunting,
forestry, scenic views, and ecological functions. Undeveloped lands
cannot have any structure used for human habitation, building used
for confined animal production, nor any building used for a
commercial purpose that is not directly related to use of the land as
farmland, forest, or a natural area. Outhouses, lean-to shelters,
historical and educational structures, and minor farm outbuildings are
permitted on undeveloped lands. Nonqualifying buildings or paved
areas on plots connected to farmlands, forests, or natural areas may
be deemed to be separate parcels that are not covered by the act.
IV. Exceptions to the Protection
A. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, the antinuisance protection accorded by this act shall not apply to:
1. Any activity conducted in a malicious, improper, or
negligent manner.
2. Any condition not in conformity with any federal, state,
or local law, ordinance, regulation (including zoning regulations), or
permit issued by a governmental agency.
3. The keeping of a diseased plant or animal, or harboring
a pest, which is injurious to human welfare or health.
4. Any condition injurious to public health or safety,
including but not limited to: (a) an improperly built or improperly
maintained septic tank, water closet, or privy, (b) untreated or
improperly treated human waste, garbage, offal, dead animal or waste
from a slaughtered animal, or (c) dangerous waste material or gas
which is harmful to human or animal life.
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B. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, the
following activities remain subject to nuisance law:
1. Any building or structure not directly used in
conjunction with agricultural or silvicultural production or the
management of scenic, outdoor recreational, cultural, historic,
archaeological, educational, or ecological resources. Buildings and
structures not qualifying under the act include those used for milling
inputs, manufacturing agricultural and forestry products, or
processing products.
2. Any building, pen, or feedlot used for the production of
confined animals meeting the definition under state law for
concentrated animal feeding operations.
3. Any lagoon employed for animal waste, and spray field
used for disposing liquid or slurry from a lagoon.
4. The clear-cutting of timber and the development of
roads.
5. The production of crops or forestry products involving
the aboveground application or storage of sewage sludge.
C. Any activity on lands within an incorporated city.
V. Retained Rights
A. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, any person,
firm, or corporation retains the right to recover damages for injuries
sustained on account of:
1. Any activity conducted in violation of any federal, state
or local statute or governmental regulation, permit, or court order.
2. Any pollution of, or change in conditions of, the waters
of any stream or on account of any discharge, overflow, or trespass.
3. Any tort for which the attractive nuisance doctrine
grants a cause of action.
B. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this act, this act
shall not affect the right of any agricultural producer to apply manure,
organic crop residuals, or processing by-products to the land at
agronomic rates as a source of nutrients for plant growth.
1. For manure application to meet the agronomic rate
requirement, the producer must develop and implement a nutrient
management plan that incorporates application rates for manure that
minimize phosphorus and nitrogen transport from the field to surface
waters in compliance with technical standards for nutrient
management.
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2. Technical standards shall include a field-specific
assessment of the potential for nitrogen and phosphorus transport
from the field to surface waters, and address the form, source,
amount, timing, and method of application of nutrients on each field
to achieve realistic production goals, while minimizing nitrogen and
phosphorus movement to surface waters.
VI. Local Governments
A. Except as provided in title VI(C), this act preempts any
local ordinance, regulation, or resolution that limits production and
management activities on undeveloped lands conducted according to
generally accepted practices.
B. Production and management activities on undeveloped
lands include only those conditions and pursuits as defined as
activities by title III(A).
C. A local unit of government may prescribe standards
regarding:
1. The keeping of a diseased plant or animal which is
injurious to human welfare or health.
2. A condition injurious to public health or safety
delineated by title IV(A)(4).
VII. Litigation Expenses
A. In any nuisance action in which an activity on undeveloped
lands covered by this act is alleged to be a nuisance, a prevailing
defendant shall recover the aggregate amount of litigation expenses
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred in the
defense of the nuisance action, together with a reasonable amount for
attorney fees.
B. For the purposes of this act, a prevailing defendant is a
defendant in a lawsuit in whose favor a final court order or judgment
is rendered. A defendant shall not be considered to have prevailed if,
prior to a final court order or judgment, he or she enters into a
negotiated settlement agreement or takes any corrective or other
action that renders unnecessary a final court order or judgment.
C. Litigation expenses mean the sum of the costs,
disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, expert
witness, and engineering fees necessary to prepare for or participate
in an action in which an activity is alleged to be a nuisance.

